fix(autopilot): add --target to value-flag set so install targets survive positional translation

Review finding on #3103: --target is installDaemon's value flag
(macos | linux-systemd | ephemeral-container | linux-cron). The
translator only knew --repo/--interval, so `gbrain autopilot
--install --target linux-cron` misread the target value as an
unknown positional subcommand and exited 2 before installDaemon ran.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/commands/autopilot.ts

@@ -151,6 +151,100 @@ export function shouldSpawnAutopilotWorker(args: string[]): boolean {
   return !args.includes('--no-worker');
 }
 
+/**
+ * #1525 — positional subcommand translation.
+ *
+ * Pre-fix, `gbrain autopilot status` silently fell through to "start daemon"
+ * because `runAutopilot()` only branched on flag forms (`--status`, etc.).
+ * `status` was treated as a stray positional and ignored.
+ *
+ * This translator maps known positional subcommands to their flag form so
+ * `autopilot status` is equivalent to `autopilot --status`, then rejects
+ * any unrecognized positional with a fail-loud error before any side
+ * effect (lockfile, daemon spawn, sync dispatch) runs.
+ *
+ * Scope decisions:
+ *   - Known aliases: `status` → `--status`, `install` → `--install`,
+ *     `uninstall` → `--uninstall`, `start` → (drop; default daemon launch).
+ *   - `stop` is intentionally NOT aliased here. Stopping a running daemon
+ *     is a new behavior (read PID from lock, SIGTERM, drain) that deserves
+ *     its own design and PR. Users typing `gbrain autopilot stop` today get
+ *     the unknown-positional error with the canonical alternatives.
+ *   - At most one positional allowed; multiple positionals fail loud.
+ */
+// Every flag that consumes the NEXT argv token. Missing one here makes the
+// translator misread the flag's value as a positional subcommand and exit 2
+// (e.g. `--install --target linux-cron`). Keep in sync with parseArg call sites.
+const AUTOPILOT_VALUE_FLAGS = new Set(['--repo', '--interval', '--target']);
+const AUTOPILOT_POSITIONAL_ALIASES: Record<string, string | null> = {
+  status: '--status',
+  install: '--install',
+  uninstall: '--uninstall',
+  start: null, // drop the positional; default behavior is daemon launch
+};
+
+export type PositionalTranslation =
+  | { ok: true; args: string[] }
+  | {
+      ok: false;
+      reason: 'unknown_subcommand' | 'multiple_subcommands';
+      message: string;
+    };
+
+export function translatePositionalSubcommands(args: string[]): PositionalTranslation {
+  const out: string[] = [];
+  let positionalSeen = false;
+  let i = 0;
+  while (i < args.length) {
+    const a = args[i];
+    if (AUTOPILOT_VALUE_FLAGS.has(a)) {
+      // Pass through the flag and its value untouched. If the value is
+      // missing at end-of-argv, fall through so the existing parseArg
+      // path can report the broken usage.
+      out.push(a);
+      if (i + 1 < args.length) {
+        out.push(args[i + 1]);
+        i += 2;
+      } else {
+        i += 1;
+      }
+      continue;
+    }
+    if (a.startsWith('-')) {
+      out.push(a);
+      i += 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+    // Positional subcommand.
+    if (positionalSeen) {
+      const known = Object.keys(AUTOPILOT_POSITIONAL_ALIASES).join(', ');
+      return {
+        ok: false,
+        reason: 'multiple_subcommands',
+        message: `Multiple subcommands given. Use only one of: ${known}.`,
+      };
+    }
+    positionalSeen = true;
+    if (a in AUTOPILOT_POSITIONAL_ALIASES) {
+      const alias = AUTOPILOT_POSITIONAL_ALIASES[a];
+      if (alias) out.push(alias);
+      i += 1;
+      continue;
+    }
+    const known = Object.keys(AUTOPILOT_POSITIONAL_ALIASES).join(', ');
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason: 'unknown_subcommand',
+      message:
+        `Unknown subcommand: \`${a}\`.\n` +
+        `Allowed subcommands: ${known}.\n` +
+        `Or use the flag form: --status, --install, --uninstall.\n` +
+        `Run \`gbrain autopilot --help\` for full usage.`,
+    };
+  }
+  return { ok: true, args: out };
+}
+
 export function isPidAlive(pid: number): boolean {
   if (!Number.isFinite(pid) || pid <= 0) return false;
   try {
@@ -363,6 +457,11 @@ export async function runAutopilot(engine: BrainEngine, args: string[]) {
       '       gbrain autopilot --install [--repo <path>]\n' +
       '       gbrain autopilot --uninstall\n' +
       '       gbrain autopilot --status [--json]\n\n' +
+      'Subcommand aliases:\n' +
+      '       gbrain autopilot status     → --status\n' +
+      '       gbrain autopilot install    → --install\n' +
+      '       gbrain autopilot uninstall  → --uninstall\n' +
+      '       gbrain autopilot start      → (default daemon launch)\n\n' +
       'Self-maintaining brain daemon. Runs the full maintenance cycle\n' +
       '(lint + backlinks + sync + extract + embed + orphans) on an interval.\n\n' +
       'For a one-shot cron-triggered cycle, see `gbrain dream`.',
@@ -370,6 +469,16 @@ export async function runAutopilot(engine: BrainEngine, args: string[]) {
     return;
   }
 
+  // #1525: translate positional subcommands to their flag form BEFORE any
+  // side effect (lockfile, daemon spawn, sync dispatch). Unknown positionals
+  // fail loud here rather than silently starting the daemon.
+  const translated = translatePositionalSubcommands(args);
+  if (!translated.ok) {
+    console.error(translated.message);
+    process.exit(2);
+  }
+  args = translated.args;
+
   if (args.includes('--install')) {
     await installDaemon(engine, args);
     return;

src/core/config.ts

@@ -908,10 +908,6 @@ export const KNOWN_CONFIG_KEYS: readonly string[] = [
   'facts.extraction_model',
   // #2113: output-token cap for the per-turn facts extractor (default 4000).
   'facts.extraction_max_tokens',
-  // Owner opt-in: let the local stdio MCP pipe read this owner's private facts
-  // (find_trajectory / recall). Default off; HTTP transport ignores it. See
-  // src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts.
-  'facts.trust_local_reads',
   // Dream cycle config
   'dream.synthesize.session_corpus_dir',
   'dream.synthesize.meeting_transcripts_dir',

src/core/engine.ts

@@ -591,8 +591,6 @@ export interface TrajectoryOpts {
   sourceIds?: string[];
   /** When true, filters to visibility='world' only. Set by MCP layer from ctx.remote. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: read private facts despite `remote`. See facts/reader-trust.ts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Metric filter. When set, only facts with this canonical metric label participate. */
   metric?: string;
   /**

src/core/facts/meta-hook.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 import type { OperationContext } from './../operations.ts';
 import type { FactRow } from './../engine.ts';
 import { effectiveConfidence } from './decay.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './reader-trust.ts';
 
 const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 30_000;
 const DEFAULT_TOP_K = 10;
@@ -51,13 +50,7 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
   const sessionId = (ctx as { source_session?: string }).source_session
     ?? null;
   const allowListHash = hashAllowList(ctx.takesHoldersAllowList);
-  // Visibility tier: untrusted remote → world-only; trusted local +
-  // owner-trusted reads → all rows. Folded into the cache key (the header's
-  // "cache entries don't bleed across tiers" invariant): trustedFactReads is
-  // re-read from config per call, so a mid-session opt-out must not keep
-  // serving a private-inclusive cached payload for the TTL window.
-  const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
-  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}::${visibility ? 'world' : 'all'}`;
+  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}`;
 
   const ttl = Math.max(1000, opts.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS);
   const topK = Math.max(1, Math.min(opts.topK ?? DEFAULT_TOP_K, 25));
@@ -68,6 +61,10 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
     return cached.payload;
   }
 
+  // Build a fresh payload. Visibility tier: remote → world-only;
+  // local → all rows.
+  const visibility = ctx.remote === false ? undefined : ['world'] as ('world' | 'private')[];
+
   let rows: FactRow[] = [];
   if (sessionId) {
     rows = await ctx.engine.listFactsBySession(sourceId, sessionId, {

src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Fact-read visibility trust.
- *
- * Fact rows are tagged `private` | `world`. Remote/untrusted callers
- * (`remote === true`) see only `world` rows — the posture that keeps a
- * published or HTTP-served brain from leaking private claims to strangers.
- *
- * But the stdio MCP server is an unauthenticated LOCAL pipe: on a single-owner
- * machine the caller IS the owner, yet it still defaults `remote: true` for
- * safety, so the owner's own agent is denied the owner's own private facts
- * (e.g. `find_trajectory` returns empty over MCP even though the facts exist).
- *
- * `trustedFactReads` is a narrow, READ-ONLY trust elevation, deliberately
- * DECOUPLED from `remote` so every other remote protection — file_upload
- * confinement, source isolation, fence stripping, takes-holder scoping — stays
- * fully in force. The stdio MCP server sets it ONLY when the brain owner opts
- * in via the `facts.trust_local_reads` config (default off). The HTTP/published
- * transport never sets it, so a served brain stays world-only regardless.
- */
-export interface FactReaderTrust {
-  /**
-   * Mirrors OperationContext.remote. FAIL-CLOSED: anything not strictly
-   * `false` is treated as remote/untrusted (CLAUDE.md trust invariant).
-   */
-  remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: this remote caller may read private facts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * True when the reader is restricted to `visibility = 'world'` rows.
- * Fail-closed: an unset/undefined `remote` is untrusted — only an explicit
- * `remote: false` (trusted local CLI) or an explicit owner opt-in
- * (`trustedFactReads: true`) reads private rows.
- */
-export function factsWorldOnly(t: FactReaderTrust): boolean {
-  return t.remote !== false && t.trustedFactReads !== true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Visibility filter for list-style fact reads: `['world']` when the reader is
- * world-only, `undefined` (no filter — all rows) when it is trusted.
- */
-export function readableFactVisibilities(
-  t: FactReaderTrust,
-): ('private' | 'world')[] | undefined {
-  return factsWorldOnly(t) ? ['world'] : undefined;
-}

src/core/operations.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import { captureEvalCandidate, isEvalCaptureEnabled, isEvalScrubEnabled } from '
 import type { HybridSearchMeta } from './types.ts';
 import { extractPageLinks, isAutoLinkEnabled, isAutoTimelineEnabled, isGlobalBasenameEnabled, parseTimelineEntries, makeResolver, type UnresolvedFrontmatterRef } from './link-extraction.ts';
 import { isFactsBackstopEligible } from './facts/eligibility.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { stripTakesFence } from './takes-fence.ts';
 import { stripFactsFence } from './facts-fence.ts';
 import { getContentFlag } from './quarantine.ts';
@@ -333,15 +332,6 @@ export interface OperationContext {
    * remote/untrusted (defense in depth in case the type is bypassed via cast).
    */
   remote: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): allow this remote caller to read
-   * `private` facts. A NARROW, read-only trust elevation decoupled from
-   * `remote` — every other remote protection (file confinement, source
-   * isolation, fence stripping, takes scoping) stays in force. Set ONLY by the
-   * stdio MCP server when the config is on; the HTTP transport never sets it.
-   * Consulted via `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /**
    * Subagent runtime context (v0.16+). Set by the subagent tool dispatcher when
    * dispatching an op as a tool call from an LLM loop. Used to enforce per-op
@@ -3639,7 +3629,6 @@ const find_trajectory: Operation = {
       entitySlug: p.entity_slug,
       ...scope,
       remote: ctx.remote === true,
-      trustedFactReads: ctx.trustedFactReads === true,
       metric,
       kind,
       since,
@@ -4000,9 +3989,13 @@ const recall: Operation = {
     const includeExpired = p.include_expired === true;
     const grep = typeof p.grep === 'string' ? p.grep.toLowerCase() : null;
 
-    // Visibility filter: world-only for untrusted remote callers; all rows for
-    // trusted local CLI and owner-trusted reads (facts.trust_local_reads).
-    const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
+    // Visibility filter: remote callers see world-only unless their token
+    // grants elevated visibility (future-proofing; v0.31 ships world-only
+    // for remote, all for local CLI).
+    const visibility =
+      ctx.remote === false
+        ? undefined
+        : ['world'] as ('private' | 'world')[];
 
     let rows: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof ctx.engine.listFactsByEntity>> = [];
 

src/core/pglite-engine.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import type {
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT, clampSearchLimit } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import { runMigrations } from './migrate.ts';
 import { PGLITE_SCHEMA_SQL, getPGLiteSchema } from './pglite-schema.ts';
@@ -4319,10 +4318,7 @@ export class PGLiteEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Build SQL dynamically. PGLite uses $N positional params; we
     // assemble the WHERE clauses + params array in tandem to keep them

src/core/postgres-engine.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import type {
   SourceRow,
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import type {
   DomainBankSampleOpts, CorpusSampleOpts, DomainBankRow,
@@ -4533,10 +4532,7 @@ export class PostgresEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Source-scope predicate: array path (federated) wins over scalar.
     // Engine.ts contract: returns chronological points; regressions +

src/mcp/dispatch.ts

@@ -30,13 +30,6 @@ export interface ToolResult {
 export interface DispatchOpts {
   /** Defaults to true (remote/untrusted). Local CLI callers (`gbrain call`) pass false. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): let this remote caller read
-   * `private` facts. Set ONLY by the stdio MCP server; the HTTP transport
-   * leaves it unset so a served brain stays world-only. See
-   * `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Override the default stderr logger (e.g. CLI uses console.* directly). */
   logger?: OperationContext['logger'];
   /**
@@ -210,7 +203,6 @@ export function buildOperationContext(
     logger: opts.logger || stderrLogger,
     dryRun: !!params.dry_run,
     remote: opts.remote ?? true,
-    trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true,
     takesHoldersAllowList: opts.takesHoldersAllowList,
     // v0.34 D4: sourceId is REQUIRED at the type level. Auto-fill 'default'
     // for single-source brains and any caller who didn't resolve a sourceId.

src/mcp/server.ts

@@ -35,16 +35,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
   // shape and cast through `any` (the SDK accepts it via the ServerResult union).
   server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request: any): Promise<any> => {
     const { name, arguments: params } = request.params;
-    // Owner opt-in: the stdio pipe is local + unauthenticated, so on a
-    // single-owner machine its caller is the owner. When facts.trust_local_reads
-    // is on, let fact reads (find_trajectory / recall) see this owner's own
-    // private facts. Narrow + read-only — every other remote protection stays
-    // on (remote stays true). HTTP transport never sets this. Best-effort: a
-    // config read blip falls back to the safe world-only default.
-    let trustedFactReads = false;
-    try {
-      trustedFactReads = (await engine.getConfig('facts.trust_local_reads')) === 'true';
-    } catch { /* keep world-only default */ }
     // v0.28: stdio MCP has no per-token auth (local pipe). Default the
     // takes-holder allow-list to ['world'] so agent-facing callers don't
     // see private hunches via takes_list / takes_search / query. Operators
@@ -52,7 +42,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
     // `gbrain call <op>` (sets remote=false in src/cli.ts).
     return dispatchToolCall(engine, name, params, {
       remote: true,
-      trustedFactReads,
       takesHoldersAllowList: ['world'],
       // v0.31: source defaults to 'default' for stdio (no per-token scope).
       // Operators who want a different source on stdio MCP should set

test/autopilot-positional-subcommands.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/**
+ * Tests for translatePositionalSubcommands() — the v0.41.x #1525 fix that
+ * prevents `gbrain autopilot status` from silently starting the daemon.
+ *
+ * IRON RULE regression guard: the exact ticket repro (`gbrain autopilot
+ * status`) MUST translate to `--status`, not fall through to the default
+ * daemon launch. Verified by the "ticket-exact repro" case below.
+ */
+
+import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
+import { translatePositionalSubcommands } from '../src/commands/autopilot.ts';
+
+describe('translatePositionalSubcommands — known aliases', () => {
+  test('IRON RULE — `autopilot status` translates to `--status` (ticket #1525 repro)', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['status']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--status']);
+  });
+
+  test('`install` translates to `--install`', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['install']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--install']);
+  });
+
+  test('`uninstall` translates to `--uninstall`', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['uninstall']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--uninstall']);
+  });
+
+  test('`start` drops the positional (default daemon launch)', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['start']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  test('`start --json` drops only the positional, keeps the flag', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['start', '--json']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--json']);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('translatePositionalSubcommands — flag/positional interleaving', () => {
+  test('`status --json` preserves the trailing flag', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['status', '--json']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--status', '--json']);
+  });
+
+  test('`--json status` preserves the leading flag', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['--json', 'status']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--json', '--status']);
+  });
+
+  test('`--repo /foo status` does not mis-classify the path as positional', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['--repo', '/foo', 'status']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--repo', '/foo', '--status']);
+  });
+
+  test('`--interval 300 install` does not mis-classify the number as positional', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['--interval', '300', 'install']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--interval', '300', '--install']);
+  });
+
+  test('`--install --target linux-cron` does not mis-classify the target as positional', () => {
+    // --target is installDaemon's value flag; its value must never be read
+    // as a positional subcommand (regression guard for the review fix).
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['--install', '--target', 'linux-cron']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--install', '--target', 'linux-cron']);
+  });
+
+  test('`install --target macos` keeps the alias translation and the target value', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['install', '--target', 'macos']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--install', '--target', 'macos']);
+  });
+
+  test('value-flag at end of argv with missing value passes through (so parseArg can report it)', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['--repo']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--repo']);
+  });
+
+  test('value-flag whose value looks like an alias is NOT translated', () => {
+    // `--repo status` means "use repo path 'status'", not "show status".
+    // Translator must not destructure the value of --repo.
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['--repo', 'status']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--repo', 'status']);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('translatePositionalSubcommands — pass-through cases', () => {
+  test('empty args returns empty args', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands([]);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  test('flag-only invocation passes through unchanged', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['--status', '--json']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['--status', '--json']);
+  });
+
+  test('short flag `-h` passes through unchanged', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['-h']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(['-h']);
+  });
+
+  test('all known bare flags pass through unchanged', () => {
+    const flags = ['--help', '--install', '--uninstall', '--status', '--json', '--inline', '--no-worker'];
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(flags);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(true);
+    if (r.ok) expect(r.args).toEqual(flags);
+  });
+});
+
+describe('translatePositionalSubcommands — rejection of unknown positionals', () => {
+  test('unknown positional `foo` fails with reason=unknown_subcommand + structured message', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['foo']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!r.ok) {
+      expect(r.reason).toBe('unknown_subcommand');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('Unknown subcommand: `foo`');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('status');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('install');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('uninstall');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('--help');
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('unknown positional `stop` fails with reason=unknown_subcommand (NOT silently aliased)', () => {
+    // Stop is mentioned in the ticket but deliberately NOT aliased in this
+    // PR — stopping a running daemon is a new behavior, not just an alias.
+    // Until that feature lands separately, `stop` must fail loud rather
+    // than starting the daemon (the bug we're fixing).
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['stop']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!r.ok) {
+      expect(r.reason).toBe('unknown_subcommand');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('Unknown subcommand: `stop`');
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('unknown positional `status-detail` (close-but-not-matching) fails', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['status-detail']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!r.ok) {
+      expect(r.reason).toBe('unknown_subcommand');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('Unknown subcommand: `status-detail`');
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('multiple positionals fail with reason=multiple_subcommands (`start install`)', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['start', 'install']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!r.ok) {
+      expect(r.reason).toBe('multiple_subcommands');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('Multiple subcommands');
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('multiple positionals fail even when both are known aliases (`status install`)', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['status', 'install']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!r.ok) {
+      expect(r.reason).toBe('multiple_subcommands');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('Multiple subcommands');
+    }
+  });
+
+  test('known-then-unknown rejects with multiple_subcommands (first-positional-wins)', () => {
+    // First positional is known, second is not. Rejection comes from the
+    // multiple-positional rule, which fires before the unknown check; the
+    // intent is "only one subcommand allowed."
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['status', 'garbage']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!r.ok) expect(r.reason).toBe('multiple_subcommands');
+  });
+
+  test('unknown-then-known rejects on the unknown (unknown fires before second-positional check)', () => {
+    const r = translatePositionalSubcommands(['garbage', 'status']);
+    expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+    if (!r.ok) {
+      expect(r.reason).toBe('unknown_subcommand');
+      expect(r.message).toContain('garbage');
+    }
+  });
+});

test/engine-find-trajectory.test.ts

@@ -165,22 +165,6 @@ describe('findTrajectory — visibility filter (D-CDX-1 / R6)', () => {
     const all = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-default' });
     expect(all.length).toBe(2);
   });
-
-  test('remote=true + trustedFactReads bypasses world-only (owner-trusted reads)', async () => {
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 50000, visibility: 'private', valid_from: new Date('2026-01-15') });
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 99999, visibility: 'world',   valid_from: new Date('2026-04-12') });
-
-    // Untrusted remote: world only.
-    const untrusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true });
-    expect(untrusted.length).toBe(1);
-    expect(untrusted[0].value).toBe(99999);
-
-    // Owner-trusted remote: sees the private point too. remote stays true — only
-    // fact-read visibility is elevated.
-    const trusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true, trustedFactReads: true });
-    expect(trusted.length).toBe(2);
-    expect(trusted.map(p => p.value).sort((a, b) => (a! - b!))).toEqual([50000, 99999]);
-  });
 });
 
 describe('findTrajectory — metric + since + until filters', () => {

test/facts-reader-trust.test.ts

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
-import {
-  factsWorldOnly,
-  readableFactVisibilities,
-} from '../src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts';
-
-describe('factsWorldOnly', () => {
-  test('FAIL-CLOSED: unset remote is untrusted (world-only)', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({})).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: undefined })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('explicit remote=false (trusted local CLI) sees all', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false })).toBe(false);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('untrusted remote callers are world-only', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('owner-trusted remote reads bypass the world-only filter', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('trustedFactReads is a no-op for an already-trusted local caller', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('readableFactVisibilities', () => {
-  test("world-only readers get the ['world'] filter (incl. unset remote)", () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true })).toEqual(['world']);
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({})).toEqual(['world']);
-  });
-
-  test('trusted readers get undefined (no filter — all rows)', () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: false })).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-});