fix(sync): guard putPage 0-row RETURNING + reclassify sync failure copy (#2189)

Root cause of #2189's opaque per-file crash: putPage's INSERT … ON CONFLICT
DO UPDATE … RETURNING can yield 0 rows when brain-local DB state (e.g. a
BEFORE trigger) suppresses the write, and rowToPage(rows[0]) then died with
"undefined is not an object (evaluating 'row.deleted_at')". Both engines now
throw a descriptive error naming the slug + source_id so the failure is
diagnosable per-file instead of an anonymous TypeError.

Also lands the salvageable parts of community PR #2586 (takeover): the
"failed to parse / fix the frontmatter" copy misclassified runtime import
errors as YAML problems — reworded to "failed to import" — plus its
first-code-sync PGLite smoke test.

New regression test reproduces the exact 0-row RETURNING state via a
suppressing trigger: fails pre-fix with the reported crash signature,
passes with the guard.

Co-authored-by: javieraldape <javieraldape@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/commands/sync.ts

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ export interface SyncResult {
   /** Pages re-embedded during this sync's auto-embed step. 0 if --no-embed or skipped. */
   embedded: number;
   pagesAffected: string[];
-  failedFiles?: number; // count of parse failures (Bug 9)
+  failedFiles?: number; // count of per-file import/sync failures (Bug 9)
   /**
    * v0.41.13.0 partial-sync fields (only set when status === 'partial').
    *
@@ -3183,7 +3183,7 @@ async function performSyncInner(engine: BrainEngine, opts: SyncOpts): Promise<Sy
     await clearOpCheckpoint(engine, ckpt.target);
   };
 
-  // issue #1939 adversarial finding #1: a file that failed to parse (open ledger
+  // issue #1939 adversarial finding #1: a file that failed to import (open ledger
   // row) and is then deleted/renamed-away never re-enters failedFiles and never
   // imports, so its row would never clear and would age doctor to a permanent
   // FAIL. Treat removed paths as resolved so the ledger self-heals.
@@ -3215,9 +3215,9 @@ async function performSyncInner(engine: BrainEngine, opts: SyncOpts): Promise<Sy
     } else {
       const fileFailCount = failedFiles.filter(f => isSkippablePath(f.path)).length;
       serr(
-        `\nSync blocked: ${fileFailCount} file(s) failed to parse:\n` +
+        `\nSync blocked: ${fileFailCount} file(s) failed to import:\n` +
         `${codeBreakdown}\n\n` +
-        `Fix the frontmatter and re-run, or use 'gbrain sync --skip-failed' to ` +
+        `Fix the listed file errors and re-run, or use 'gbrain sync --skip-failed' to ` +
         `acknowledge and move on. A file that keeps failing auto-skips after ` +
         `${resolveAutoSkipThreshold()} consecutive syncs.`,
       );
@@ -5355,7 +5355,7 @@ function printSyncResult(result: SyncResult, sink: NodeJS.WriteStream = process.
     case 'dry_run':
       break; // already printed in performSync
     case 'blocked_by_failures':
-      write(`Sync BLOCKED at ${result.toCommit.slice(0, 8)}: ${result.failedFiles ?? 0} file(s) failed to parse.`);
+      write(`Sync BLOCKED at ${result.toCommit.slice(0, 8)}: ${result.failedFiles ?? 0} file(s) failed to import.`);
       write(`  See ~/.gbrain/sync-failures.jsonl for details, or run 'gbrain doctor'.`);
       write(`  Fix the files then re-run 'gbrain sync', or 'gbrain sync --skip-failed' to move on.`);
       break;

src/core/config.ts

@@ -908,10 +908,6 @@ export const KNOWN_CONFIG_KEYS: readonly string[] = [
   'facts.extraction_model',
   // #2113: output-token cap for the per-turn facts extractor (default 4000).
   'facts.extraction_max_tokens',
-  // Owner opt-in: let the local stdio MCP pipe read this owner's private facts
-  // (find_trajectory / recall). Default off; HTTP transport ignores it. See
-  // src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts.
-  'facts.trust_local_reads',
   // Dream cycle config
   'dream.synthesize.session_corpus_dir',
   'dream.synthesize.meeting_transcripts_dir',

src/core/engine.ts

@@ -591,8 +591,6 @@ export interface TrajectoryOpts {
   sourceIds?: string[];
   /** When true, filters to visibility='world' only. Set by MCP layer from ctx.remote. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: read private facts despite `remote`. See facts/reader-trust.ts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Metric filter. When set, only facts with this canonical metric label participate. */
   metric?: string;
   /**

src/core/facts/meta-hook.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 import type { OperationContext } from './../operations.ts';
 import type { FactRow } from './../engine.ts';
 import { effectiveConfidence } from './decay.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './reader-trust.ts';
 
 const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 30_000;
 const DEFAULT_TOP_K = 10;
@@ -51,13 +50,7 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
   const sessionId = (ctx as { source_session?: string }).source_session
     ?? null;
   const allowListHash = hashAllowList(ctx.takesHoldersAllowList);
-  // Visibility tier: untrusted remote → world-only; trusted local +
-  // owner-trusted reads → all rows. Folded into the cache key (the header's
-  // "cache entries don't bleed across tiers" invariant): trustedFactReads is
-  // re-read from config per call, so a mid-session opt-out must not keep
-  // serving a private-inclusive cached payload for the TTL window.
-  const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
-  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}::${visibility ? 'world' : 'all'}`;
+  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}`;
 
   const ttl = Math.max(1000, opts.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS);
   const topK = Math.max(1, Math.min(opts.topK ?? DEFAULT_TOP_K, 25));
@@ -68,6 +61,10 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
     return cached.payload;
   }
 
+  // Build a fresh payload. Visibility tier: remote → world-only;
+  // local → all rows.
+  const visibility = ctx.remote === false ? undefined : ['world'] as ('world' | 'private')[];
+
   let rows: FactRow[] = [];
   if (sessionId) {
     rows = await ctx.engine.listFactsBySession(sourceId, sessionId, {

src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Fact-read visibility trust.
- *
- * Fact rows are tagged `private` | `world`. Remote/untrusted callers
- * (`remote === true`) see only `world` rows — the posture that keeps a
- * published or HTTP-served brain from leaking private claims to strangers.
- *
- * But the stdio MCP server is an unauthenticated LOCAL pipe: on a single-owner
- * machine the caller IS the owner, yet it still defaults `remote: true` for
- * safety, so the owner's own agent is denied the owner's own private facts
- * (e.g. `find_trajectory` returns empty over MCP even though the facts exist).
- *
- * `trustedFactReads` is a narrow, READ-ONLY trust elevation, deliberately
- * DECOUPLED from `remote` so every other remote protection — file_upload
- * confinement, source isolation, fence stripping, takes-holder scoping — stays
- * fully in force. The stdio MCP server sets it ONLY when the brain owner opts
- * in via the `facts.trust_local_reads` config (default off). The HTTP/published
- * transport never sets it, so a served brain stays world-only regardless.
- */
-export interface FactReaderTrust {
-  /**
-   * Mirrors OperationContext.remote. FAIL-CLOSED: anything not strictly
-   * `false` is treated as remote/untrusted (CLAUDE.md trust invariant).
-   */
-  remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: this remote caller may read private facts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * True when the reader is restricted to `visibility = 'world'` rows.
- * Fail-closed: an unset/undefined `remote` is untrusted — only an explicit
- * `remote: false` (trusted local CLI) or an explicit owner opt-in
- * (`trustedFactReads: true`) reads private rows.
- */
-export function factsWorldOnly(t: FactReaderTrust): boolean {
-  return t.remote !== false && t.trustedFactReads !== true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Visibility filter for list-style fact reads: `['world']` when the reader is
- * world-only, `undefined` (no filter — all rows) when it is trusted.
- */
-export function readableFactVisibilities(
-  t: FactReaderTrust,
-): ('private' | 'world')[] | undefined {
-  return factsWorldOnly(t) ? ['world'] : undefined;
-}

src/core/operations.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import { captureEvalCandidate, isEvalCaptureEnabled, isEvalScrubEnabled } from '
 import type { HybridSearchMeta } from './types.ts';
 import { extractPageLinks, isAutoLinkEnabled, isAutoTimelineEnabled, isGlobalBasenameEnabled, parseTimelineEntries, makeResolver, type UnresolvedFrontmatterRef } from './link-extraction.ts';
 import { isFactsBackstopEligible } from './facts/eligibility.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { stripTakesFence } from './takes-fence.ts';
 import { stripFactsFence } from './facts-fence.ts';
 import { getContentFlag } from './quarantine.ts';
@@ -333,15 +332,6 @@ export interface OperationContext {
    * remote/untrusted (defense in depth in case the type is bypassed via cast).
    */
   remote: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): allow this remote caller to read
-   * `private` facts. A NARROW, read-only trust elevation decoupled from
-   * `remote` — every other remote protection (file confinement, source
-   * isolation, fence stripping, takes scoping) stays in force. Set ONLY by the
-   * stdio MCP server when the config is on; the HTTP transport never sets it.
-   * Consulted via `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /**
    * Subagent runtime context (v0.16+). Set by the subagent tool dispatcher when
    * dispatching an op as a tool call from an LLM loop. Used to enforce per-op
@@ -3639,7 +3629,6 @@ const find_trajectory: Operation = {
       entitySlug: p.entity_slug,
       ...scope,
       remote: ctx.remote === true,
-      trustedFactReads: ctx.trustedFactReads === true,
       metric,
       kind,
       since,
@@ -4000,9 +3989,13 @@ const recall: Operation = {
     const includeExpired = p.include_expired === true;
     const grep = typeof p.grep === 'string' ? p.grep.toLowerCase() : null;
 
-    // Visibility filter: world-only for untrusted remote callers; all rows for
-    // trusted local CLI and owner-trusted reads (facts.trust_local_reads).
-    const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
+    // Visibility filter: remote callers see world-only unless their token
+    // grants elevated visibility (future-proofing; v0.31 ships world-only
+    // for remote, all for local CLI).
+    const visibility =
+      ctx.remote === false
+        ? undefined
+        : ['world'] as ('private' | 'world')[];
 
     let rows: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof ctx.engine.listFactsByEntity>> = [];
 

src/core/pglite-engine.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import type {
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT, clampSearchLimit } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import { runMigrations } from './migrate.ts';
 import { PGLITE_SCHEMA_SQL, getPGLiteSchema } from './pglite-schema.ts';
@@ -1059,6 +1058,16 @@ export class PGLiteEngine implements BrainEngine {
        RETURNING id, source_id, slug, type, title, compiled_truth, timeline, frontmatter, content_hash, created_at, updated_at, effective_date, effective_date_source, import_filename, source_kind, source_uri, ingested_via, ingested_at`,
       [sourceId, slug, page.type, pageKind, page.title, page.compiled_truth, page.timeline || '', JSON.stringify(frontmatter), hash, effectiveDate, effectiveDateSource, importFilename, chunkerVersion, sourcePath, sourceKind, sourceUri, ingestedVia, ingestedAt]
     );
+    // #2189: an INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE … RETURNING that yields 0 rows
+    // (e.g. a BEFORE trigger suppressing the write) previously crashed in
+    // rowToPage with an opaque "undefined is not an object (row.deleted_at)".
+    // Throw a diagnosable error naming the row instead. Mirrors postgres-engine.ts.
+    if (!rows[0]) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `putPage: INSERT … RETURNING produced no row for slug='${slug}' source_id='${sourceId}'. ` +
+        `A trigger or rule on the pages table may be suppressing the write.`
+      );
+    }
     return rowToPage(rows[0] as Record<string, unknown>);
   }
 
@@ -4319,10 +4328,7 @@ export class PGLiteEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Build SQL dynamically. PGLite uses $N positional params; we
     // assemble the WHERE clauses + params array in tandem to keep them

src/core/postgres-engine.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import type {
   SourceRow,
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import type {
   DomainBankSampleOpts, CorpusSampleOpts, DomainBankRow,
@@ -1120,6 +1119,16 @@ export class PostgresEngine implements BrainEngine {
         ingested_at           = COALESCE(EXCLUDED.ingested_at,           pages.ingested_at)
       RETURNING id, source_id, slug, type, title, compiled_truth, timeline, frontmatter, content_hash, created_at, updated_at, effective_date, effective_date_source, import_filename, source_kind, source_uri, ingested_via, ingested_at
     `;
+    // #2189: an INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE … RETURNING that yields 0 rows
+    // (e.g. a BEFORE trigger suppressing the write) previously crashed in
+    // rowToPage with an opaque "undefined is not an object (row.deleted_at)".
+    // Throw a diagnosable error naming the row instead. Mirrors pglite-engine.ts.
+    if (!rows[0]) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `putPage: INSERT … RETURNING produced no row for slug='${slug}' source_id='${sourceId}'. ` +
+        `A trigger or rule on the pages table may be suppressing the write.`
+      );
+    }
     return rowToPage(rows[0]);
   }
 
@@ -4533,10 +4542,7 @@ export class PostgresEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Source-scope predicate: array path (federated) wins over scalar.
     // Engine.ts contract: returns chronological points; regressions +

src/mcp/dispatch.ts

@@ -30,13 +30,6 @@ export interface ToolResult {
 export interface DispatchOpts {
   /** Defaults to true (remote/untrusted). Local CLI callers (`gbrain call`) pass false. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): let this remote caller read
-   * `private` facts. Set ONLY by the stdio MCP server; the HTTP transport
-   * leaves it unset so a served brain stays world-only. See
-   * `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Override the default stderr logger (e.g. CLI uses console.* directly). */
   logger?: OperationContext['logger'];
   /**
@@ -210,7 +203,6 @@ export function buildOperationContext(
     logger: opts.logger || stderrLogger,
     dryRun: !!params.dry_run,
     remote: opts.remote ?? true,
-    trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true,
     takesHoldersAllowList: opts.takesHoldersAllowList,
     // v0.34 D4: sourceId is REQUIRED at the type level. Auto-fill 'default'
     // for single-source brains and any caller who didn't resolve a sourceId.

src/mcp/server.ts

@@ -35,16 +35,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
   // shape and cast through `any` (the SDK accepts it via the ServerResult union).
   server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request: any): Promise<any> => {
     const { name, arguments: params } = request.params;
-    // Owner opt-in: the stdio pipe is local + unauthenticated, so on a
-    // single-owner machine its caller is the owner. When facts.trust_local_reads
-    // is on, let fact reads (find_trajectory / recall) see this owner's own
-    // private facts. Narrow + read-only — every other remote protection stays
-    // on (remote stays true). HTTP transport never sets this. Best-effort: a
-    // config read blip falls back to the safe world-only default.
-    let trustedFactReads = false;
-    try {
-      trustedFactReads = (await engine.getConfig('facts.trust_local_reads')) === 'true';
-    } catch { /* keep world-only default */ }
     // v0.28: stdio MCP has no per-token auth (local pipe). Default the
     // takes-holder allow-list to ['world'] so agent-facing callers don't
     // see private hunches via takes_list / takes_search / query. Operators
@@ -52,7 +42,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
     // `gbrain call <op>` (sets remote=false in src/cli.ts).
     return dispatchToolCall(engine, name, params, {
       remote: true,
-      trustedFactReads,
       takesHoldersAllowList: ['world'],
       // v0.31: source defaults to 'default' for stdio (no per-token scope).
       // Operators who want a different source on stdio MCP should set

test/engine-find-trajectory.test.ts

@@ -165,22 +165,6 @@ describe('findTrajectory — visibility filter (D-CDX-1 / R6)', () => {
     const all = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-default' });
     expect(all.length).toBe(2);
   });
-
-  test('remote=true + trustedFactReads bypasses world-only (owner-trusted reads)', async () => {
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 50000, visibility: 'private', valid_from: new Date('2026-01-15') });
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 99999, visibility: 'world',   valid_from: new Date('2026-04-12') });
-
-    // Untrusted remote: world only.
-    const untrusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true });
-    expect(untrusted.length).toBe(1);
-    expect(untrusted[0].value).toBe(99999);
-
-    // Owner-trusted remote: sees the private point too. remote stays true — only
-    // fact-read visibility is elevated.
-    const trusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true, trustedFactReads: true });
-    expect(trusted.length).toBe(2);
-    expect(trusted.map(p => p.value).sort((a, b) => (a! - b!))).toEqual([50000, 99999]);
-  });
 });
 
 describe('findTrajectory — metric + since + until filters', () => {

test/facts-reader-trust.test.ts

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
-import {
-  factsWorldOnly,
-  readableFactVisibilities,
-} from '../src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts';
-
-describe('factsWorldOnly', () => {
-  test('FAIL-CLOSED: unset remote is untrusted (world-only)', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({})).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: undefined })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('explicit remote=false (trusted local CLI) sees all', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false })).toBe(false);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('untrusted remote callers are world-only', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('owner-trusted remote reads bypass the world-only filter', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('trustedFactReads is a no-op for an already-trusted local caller', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('readableFactVisibilities', () => {
-  test("world-only readers get the ['world'] filter (incl. unset remote)", () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true })).toEqual(['world']);
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({})).toEqual(['world']);
-  });
-
-  test('trusted readers get undefined (no filter — all rows)', () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: false })).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-});

test/putpage-returning-guard.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+// #2189 regression guard: putPage's INSERT … ON CONFLICT DO UPDATE … RETURNING
+// can yield 0 rows when brain-local DB state (e.g. a BEFORE INSERT trigger)
+// suppresses the write. Pre-fix, rowToPage(rows[0]) crashed with the opaque
+// "undefined is not an object (evaluating 'row.deleted_at')" that failed
+// ~all files of a code sync. Post-fix, putPage throws a descriptive error
+// naming the slug + source_id so the failure is diagnosable per-file.
+//
+// Same guard lands in postgres-engine.ts (engine-parity invariant); this test
+// exercises the PGLite side, where the issue was reported.
+
+import { describe, expect, test, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
+import { PGLiteEngine } from '../src/core/pglite-engine.ts';
+
+let engine: PGLiteEngine;
+
+beforeAll(async () => {
+  engine = new PGLiteEngine();
+  await engine.connect({});
+  await engine.initSchema();
+  // Simulate the reporter's state-dependent failure: a trigger that
+  // suppresses inserts for one slug, making RETURNING produce no row.
+  await engine.executeRaw(`
+    CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION suppress_pages_insert() RETURNS trigger AS $$
+    BEGIN
+      IF NEW.slug = 'suppressed-page' THEN RETURN NULL; END IF;
+      RETURN NEW;
+    END;
+    $$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;
+  `);
+  await engine.executeRaw(`
+    CREATE TRIGGER suppress_pages_insert_trg
+    BEFORE INSERT ON pages
+    FOR EACH ROW EXECUTE FUNCTION suppress_pages_insert();
+  `);
+});
+
+afterAll(async () => {
+  await engine.executeRaw('DROP TRIGGER IF EXISTS suppress_pages_insert_trg ON pages');
+  await engine.executeRaw('DROP FUNCTION IF EXISTS suppress_pages_insert');
+  await engine.disconnect();
+});
+
+describe('putPage RETURNING guard (#2189)', () => {
+  test('0-row RETURNING throws a descriptive error, not row.deleted_at TypeError', async () => {
+    let err: Error | undefined;
+    try {
+      await engine.putPage('suppressed-page', {
+        type: 'code',
+        title: 'Suppressed',
+        compiled_truth: 'x',
+        timeline: '',
+      });
+    } catch (e) {
+      err = e as Error;
+    }
+    expect(err).toBeDefined();
+    expect(err!.message).toContain('putPage');
+    expect(err!.message).toContain("slug='suppressed-page'");
+    expect(err!.message).toContain("source_id='default'");
+    // The pre-fix crash signature must be gone.
+    expect(err!.message).not.toContain('deleted_at');
+  });
+
+  test('unsuppressed slugs still upsert normally with the trigger installed', async () => {
+    const page = await engine.putPage('normal-page', {
+      type: 'concept',
+      title: 'Normal',
+      compiled_truth: 'y',
+      timeline: '',
+    });
+    expect(page.slug).toBe('normal-page');
+    expect(page.source_id).toBe('default');
+  });
+});

test/sync.test.ts

@@ -375,6 +375,31 @@ describe('performSync dry-run never writes', () => {
     expect(messages.some(m => m.includes('git pull failed'))).toBe(false);
   });
 
+  test('first PGLite code sync imports code files without runtime failures', async () => {
+    const { performSync } = await import('../src/commands/sync.ts');
+    mkdirSync(join(repoPath, 'src'), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(
+      join(repoPath, 'src/example.ts'),
+      'export function add(left: number, right: number) { return left + right; }\n',
+    );
+    execSync('git add -A && git commit -m "add code file"', { cwd: repoPath, stdio: 'pipe' });
+
+    const result = await performSync(engine, {
+      repoPath,
+      noPull: true,
+      noEmbed: true,
+      noExtract: true,
+      strategy: 'code',
+    });
+
+    expect(result.status).toBe('first_sync');
+    expect(result.added).toBe(1);
+    expect(result.failedFiles ?? 0).toBe(0);
+    const page = await engine.getPage('src-example-ts');
+    expect(page?.type).toBe('code');
+    expect(page?.frontmatter).toMatchObject({ file: 'src/example.ts', language: 'typescript' });
+  });
+
   test('incremental dry-run does NOT write to DB or advance the bookmark', async () => {
     const { performSync } = await import('../src/commands/sync.ts');
     // First do a real sync to seed the bookmark.