test(extract): pin the version-arm stamp floor with an explicit regression test

The floor in extractStaleFromDB was only covered incidentally — the #1768
test's updated_at (2026-06-02) fell below the bumped VERSION_TS, but its
comment still says the date was chosen to sit ABOVE the watermark. A future
date 'repair' there would silently drop floor coverage. This test pins it
directly: pre-watermark page clears after --stale and stays cleared.
Verified fail-without-fix against master's extract.ts.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

src/commands/extract.ts

@@ -1743,7 +1743,15 @@ async function extractStaleFromDB(
       // `page.updated_at.toISOString()` — the JS Date is ms-truncated, so the
       // µs-precision DB updated_at stayed strictly greater and the page never
       // cleared on Postgres. Stamping the exact value makes them equal.
-      processedRefs.push({ slug: page.slug, source_id: page.source_id, extractedAt: page.updated_at_iso });
+      //
+      // Version-arm floor: a page last edited BEFORE LINK_EXTRACTOR_VERSION_TS
+      // would otherwise be stamped below the version watermark and stay
+      // permanently stale (`links_extracted_at < versionTs` re-fires every run).
+      // Stamp max(updated_at, versionTs) — versionTs is always a past release
+      // date, so a concurrent edit's now() still exceeds the stamp and D4 holds.
+      // Tie at ms precision picks updated_at_iso (its µs ≥ versionTs's .000000).
+      const stampTs = new Date(page.updated_at_iso) >= new Date(versionTs) ? page.updated_at_iso : versionTs;
+      processedRefs.push({ slug: page.slug, source_id: page.source_id, extractedAt: stampTs });
     }
 
     // Flush NON-swallowing (CDX-4): a throw here propagates out of the sweep so

src/core/config.ts

@@ -908,10 +908,6 @@ export const KNOWN_CONFIG_KEYS: readonly string[] = [
   'facts.extraction_model',
   // #2113: output-token cap for the per-turn facts extractor (default 4000).
   'facts.extraction_max_tokens',
-  // Owner opt-in: let the local stdio MCP pipe read this owner's private facts
-  // (find_trajectory / recall). Default off; HTTP transport ignores it. See
-  // src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts.
-  'facts.trust_local_reads',
   // Dream cycle config
   'dream.synthesize.session_corpus_dir',
   'dream.synthesize.meeting_transcripts_dir',

src/core/engine.ts

@@ -591,8 +591,6 @@ export interface TrajectoryOpts {
   sourceIds?: string[];
   /** When true, filters to visibility='world' only. Set by MCP layer from ctx.remote. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: read private facts despite `remote`. See facts/reader-trust.ts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Metric filter. When set, only facts with this canonical metric label participate. */
   metric?: string;
   /**

src/core/facts/meta-hook.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 import type { OperationContext } from './../operations.ts';
 import type { FactRow } from './../engine.ts';
 import { effectiveConfidence } from './decay.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './reader-trust.ts';
 
 const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 30_000;
 const DEFAULT_TOP_K = 10;
@@ -51,13 +50,7 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
   const sessionId = (ctx as { source_session?: string }).source_session
     ?? null;
   const allowListHash = hashAllowList(ctx.takesHoldersAllowList);
-  // Visibility tier: untrusted remote → world-only; trusted local +
-  // owner-trusted reads → all rows. Folded into the cache key (the header's
-  // "cache entries don't bleed across tiers" invariant): trustedFactReads is
-  // re-read from config per call, so a mid-session opt-out must not keep
-  // serving a private-inclusive cached payload for the TTL window.
-  const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
-  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}::${visibility ? 'world' : 'all'}`;
+  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}`;
 
   const ttl = Math.max(1000, opts.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS);
   const topK = Math.max(1, Math.min(opts.topK ?? DEFAULT_TOP_K, 25));
@@ -68,6 +61,10 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
     return cached.payload;
   }
 
+  // Build a fresh payload. Visibility tier: remote → world-only;
+  // local → all rows.
+  const visibility = ctx.remote === false ? undefined : ['world'] as ('world' | 'private')[];
+
   let rows: FactRow[] = [];
   if (sessionId) {
     rows = await ctx.engine.listFactsBySession(sourceId, sessionId, {

src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Fact-read visibility trust.
- *
- * Fact rows are tagged `private` | `world`. Remote/untrusted callers
- * (`remote === true`) see only `world` rows — the posture that keeps a
- * published or HTTP-served brain from leaking private claims to strangers.
- *
- * But the stdio MCP server is an unauthenticated LOCAL pipe: on a single-owner
- * machine the caller IS the owner, yet it still defaults `remote: true` for
- * safety, so the owner's own agent is denied the owner's own private facts
- * (e.g. `find_trajectory` returns empty over MCP even though the facts exist).
- *
- * `trustedFactReads` is a narrow, READ-ONLY trust elevation, deliberately
- * DECOUPLED from `remote` so every other remote protection — file_upload
- * confinement, source isolation, fence stripping, takes-holder scoping — stays
- * fully in force. The stdio MCP server sets it ONLY when the brain owner opts
- * in via the `facts.trust_local_reads` config (default off). The HTTP/published
- * transport never sets it, so a served brain stays world-only regardless.
- */
-export interface FactReaderTrust {
-  /**
-   * Mirrors OperationContext.remote. FAIL-CLOSED: anything not strictly
-   * `false` is treated as remote/untrusted (CLAUDE.md trust invariant).
-   */
-  remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: this remote caller may read private facts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * True when the reader is restricted to `visibility = 'world'` rows.
- * Fail-closed: an unset/undefined `remote` is untrusted — only an explicit
- * `remote: false` (trusted local CLI) or an explicit owner opt-in
- * (`trustedFactReads: true`) reads private rows.
- */
-export function factsWorldOnly(t: FactReaderTrust): boolean {
-  return t.remote !== false && t.trustedFactReads !== true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Visibility filter for list-style fact reads: `['world']` when the reader is
- * world-only, `undefined` (no filter — all rows) when it is trusted.
- */
-export function readableFactVisibilities(
-  t: FactReaderTrust,
-): ('private' | 'world')[] | undefined {
-  return factsWorldOnly(t) ? ['world'] : undefined;
-}

src/core/link-extraction.ts

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ import { ensureWellFormed } from './text-safe.ts';
  * OR updated_at > links_extracted_at`. It is an ISO-8601 string (NOT a number) —
  * the column is TIMESTAMPTZ and the predicate binds it as `::timestamptz`.
  */
-export const LINK_EXTRACTOR_VERSION_TS = '2026-05-31T00:00:00Z';
+export const LINK_EXTRACTOR_VERSION_TS = '2026-07-21T00:00:00Z';
 
 // ─── Entity references ──────────────────────────────────────────
 
@@ -80,10 +80,10 @@ export type LinkResolutionType = 'qualified' | 'unqualified';
  * Directory prefix whitelist. These are the top-level slug dirs the extractor
  * recognizes as entity references. Upstream canonical + our extensions:
  *   - Gbrain canonical: people, companies, meetings, concepts, deal, civic, project, source, media, yc, projects
- *   - Our domain extensions: tech, finance, personal, openclaw (domain-organized wikis)
+ *   - Our domain extensions: tech, finance, personal, openclaw, ops (domain-organized wikis)
  *   - Our entity prefix: entities (we kept some legacy entities/projects/ pages)
  */
-const DIR_PATTERN = '(?:people|companies|meetings|concepts|deal|civic|project|projects|source|media|yc|tech|finance|personal|openclaw|entities)';
+const DIR_PATTERN = '(?:people|companies|meetings|concepts|deal|civic|project|projects|source|media|yc|tech|finance|personal|openclaw|entities|ops)';
 
 /**
  * Match `[Name](path)` markdown links pointing to entity directories.
@@ -865,7 +865,16 @@ export function queryBasenameIndex(idx: Map<string, string[]>, name: string): st
   if (!name || typeof name !== 'string') return [];
   const trimmed = name.trim();
   if (!trimmed) return [];
-  const hit = idx.get(trimmed) ?? idx.get(trimmed.toLowerCase()) ?? idx.get(normalizeBasename(trimmed));
+  let hit = idx.get(trimmed) ?? idx.get(trimmed.toLowerCase()) ?? idx.get(normalizeBasename(trimmed));
+  // Issue #2576 bug 2: path-style refs (`runbooks/2026-05-01-x`) from dirs
+  // outside DIR_PATTERN reach here, but normalizeBasename strips slashes
+  // into a garbage key (`runbooks2026-05-01-x`) that can never hit the
+  // tail-keyed index. Fall back to the path tail so qualified refs resolve
+  // by basename like everything else.
+  if (!hit && trimmed.includes('/')) {
+    const tail = trimmed.slice(trimmed.lastIndexOf('/') + 1).trim();
+    if (tail) hit = idx.get(tail) ?? idx.get(tail.toLowerCase()) ?? idx.get(normalizeBasename(tail));
+  }
   return hit ? [...hit].sort(basenameSort) : [];
 }
 

src/core/operations.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import { captureEvalCandidate, isEvalCaptureEnabled, isEvalScrubEnabled } from '
 import type { HybridSearchMeta } from './types.ts';
 import { extractPageLinks, isAutoLinkEnabled, isAutoTimelineEnabled, isGlobalBasenameEnabled, parseTimelineEntries, makeResolver, type UnresolvedFrontmatterRef } from './link-extraction.ts';
 import { isFactsBackstopEligible } from './facts/eligibility.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { stripTakesFence } from './takes-fence.ts';
 import { stripFactsFence } from './facts-fence.ts';
 import { getContentFlag } from './quarantine.ts';
@@ -333,15 +332,6 @@ export interface OperationContext {
    * remote/untrusted (defense in depth in case the type is bypassed via cast).
    */
   remote: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): allow this remote caller to read
-   * `private` facts. A NARROW, read-only trust elevation decoupled from
-   * `remote` — every other remote protection (file confinement, source
-   * isolation, fence stripping, takes scoping) stays in force. Set ONLY by the
-   * stdio MCP server when the config is on; the HTTP transport never sets it.
-   * Consulted via `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /**
    * Subagent runtime context (v0.16+). Set by the subagent tool dispatcher when
    * dispatching an op as a tool call from an LLM loop. Used to enforce per-op
@@ -3639,7 +3629,6 @@ const find_trajectory: Operation = {
       entitySlug: p.entity_slug,
       ...scope,
       remote: ctx.remote === true,
-      trustedFactReads: ctx.trustedFactReads === true,
       metric,
       kind,
       since,
@@ -4000,9 +3989,13 @@ const recall: Operation = {
     const includeExpired = p.include_expired === true;
     const grep = typeof p.grep === 'string' ? p.grep.toLowerCase() : null;
 
-    // Visibility filter: world-only for untrusted remote callers; all rows for
-    // trusted local CLI and owner-trusted reads (facts.trust_local_reads).
-    const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
+    // Visibility filter: remote callers see world-only unless their token
+    // grants elevated visibility (future-proofing; v0.31 ships world-only
+    // for remote, all for local CLI).
+    const visibility =
+      ctx.remote === false
+        ? undefined
+        : ['world'] as ('private' | 'world')[];
 
     let rows: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof ctx.engine.listFactsByEntity>> = [];
 

src/core/pglite-engine.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import type {
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT, clampSearchLimit } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import { runMigrations } from './migrate.ts';
 import { PGLITE_SCHEMA_SQL, getPGLiteSchema } from './pglite-schema.ts';
@@ -4319,10 +4318,7 @@ export class PGLiteEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Build SQL dynamically. PGLite uses $N positional params; we
     // assemble the WHERE clauses + params array in tandem to keep them

src/core/postgres-engine.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import type {
   SourceRow,
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import type {
   DomainBankSampleOpts, CorpusSampleOpts, DomainBankRow,
@@ -4533,10 +4532,7 @@ export class PostgresEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Source-scope predicate: array path (federated) wins over scalar.
     // Engine.ts contract: returns chronological points; regressions +

src/mcp/dispatch.ts

@@ -30,13 +30,6 @@ export interface ToolResult {
 export interface DispatchOpts {
   /** Defaults to true (remote/untrusted). Local CLI callers (`gbrain call`) pass false. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): let this remote caller read
-   * `private` facts. Set ONLY by the stdio MCP server; the HTTP transport
-   * leaves it unset so a served brain stays world-only. See
-   * `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Override the default stderr logger (e.g. CLI uses console.* directly). */
   logger?: OperationContext['logger'];
   /**
@@ -210,7 +203,6 @@ export function buildOperationContext(
     logger: opts.logger || stderrLogger,
     dryRun: !!params.dry_run,
     remote: opts.remote ?? true,
-    trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true,
     takesHoldersAllowList: opts.takesHoldersAllowList,
     // v0.34 D4: sourceId is REQUIRED at the type level. Auto-fill 'default'
     // for single-source brains and any caller who didn't resolve a sourceId.

src/mcp/server.ts

@@ -35,16 +35,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
   // shape and cast through `any` (the SDK accepts it via the ServerResult union).
   server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request: any): Promise<any> => {
     const { name, arguments: params } = request.params;
-    // Owner opt-in: the stdio pipe is local + unauthenticated, so on a
-    // single-owner machine its caller is the owner. When facts.trust_local_reads
-    // is on, let fact reads (find_trajectory / recall) see this owner's own
-    // private facts. Narrow + read-only — every other remote protection stays
-    // on (remote stays true). HTTP transport never sets this. Best-effort: a
-    // config read blip falls back to the safe world-only default.
-    let trustedFactReads = false;
-    try {
-      trustedFactReads = (await engine.getConfig('facts.trust_local_reads')) === 'true';
-    } catch { /* keep world-only default */ }
     // v0.28: stdio MCP has no per-token auth (local pipe). Default the
     // takes-holder allow-list to ['world'] so agent-facing callers don't
     // see private hunches via takes_list / takes_search / query. Operators
@@ -52,7 +42,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
     // `gbrain call <op>` (sets remote=false in src/cli.ts).
     return dispatchToolCall(engine, name, params, {
       remote: true,
-      trustedFactReads,
       takesHoldersAllowList: ['world'],
       // v0.31: source defaults to 'default' for stdio (no per-token scope).
       // Operators who want a different source on stdio MCP should set

test/engine-find-trajectory.test.ts

@@ -165,22 +165,6 @@ describe('findTrajectory — visibility filter (D-CDX-1 / R6)', () => {
     const all = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-default' });
     expect(all.length).toBe(2);
   });
-
-  test('remote=true + trustedFactReads bypasses world-only (owner-trusted reads)', async () => {
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 50000, visibility: 'private', valid_from: new Date('2026-01-15') });
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 99999, visibility: 'world',   valid_from: new Date('2026-04-12') });
-
-    // Untrusted remote: world only.
-    const untrusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true });
-    expect(untrusted.length).toBe(1);
-    expect(untrusted[0].value).toBe(99999);
-
-    // Owner-trusted remote: sees the private point too. remote stays true — only
-    // fact-read visibility is elevated.
-    const trusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true, trustedFactReads: true });
-    expect(trusted.length).toBe(2);
-    expect(trusted.map(p => p.value).sort((a, b) => (a! - b!))).toEqual([50000, 99999]);
-  });
 });
 
 describe('findTrajectory — metric + since + until filters', () => {

test/extract-stale.test.ts

@@ -209,6 +209,24 @@ describe('gbrain extract --stale', () => {
     expect(usRows[0]?.eq).toBe(true);
   });
 
+  test('version-arm floor: page edited BEFORE LINK_EXTRACTOR_VERSION_TS clears after --stale (issue #2576 bug 3)', async () => {
+    // A page whose updated_at predates the version watermark used to be
+    // stamped at its updated_at (< versionTs), so the version arm re-fired
+    // every run — permanently stale. The sweep now floors the stamp at
+    // versionTs. (The #1768 test above also covers this since the v0.42.x
+    // VERSION_TS bump moved its date below the watermark, but this pins the
+    // behavior explicitly so a date "repair" there can't drop coverage.)
+    await engine.putPage('people/alice', personPage('Alice'));
+    await engine.executeRaw(`UPDATE pages SET updated_at = '2000-01-01T00:00:00Z' WHERE slug = 'people/alice'`);
+    expect(await engine.countStalePagesForExtraction({ versionTs: LINK_EXTRACTOR_VERSION_TS })).toBe(1);
+
+    await runExtract(engine, ['--stale']);
+    // Pre-floor this stayed 1 forever (stamp < versionTs → version arm re-fires).
+    expect(await engine.countStalePagesForExtraction({ versionTs: LINK_EXTRACTOR_VERSION_TS })).toBe(0);
+    await runExtract(engine, ['--stale']);
+    expect(await engine.countStalePagesForExtraction({ versionTs: LINK_EXTRACTOR_VERSION_TS })).toBe(0);
+  });
+
   test('CDX-4 (D2): a link-flush throw aborts the sweep and leaves pages UNSTAMPED', async () => {
     await engine.putPage('people/alice', personPage('Alice'));
     await engine.putPage('companies/acme', companyPage('Acme', '[Alice](people/alice) founded [Acme](companies/acme).'));

test/facts-reader-trust.test.ts

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
-import {
-  factsWorldOnly,
-  readableFactVisibilities,
-} from '../src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts';
-
-describe('factsWorldOnly', () => {
-  test('FAIL-CLOSED: unset remote is untrusted (world-only)', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({})).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: undefined })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('explicit remote=false (trusted local CLI) sees all', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false })).toBe(false);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('untrusted remote callers are world-only', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('owner-trusted remote reads bypass the world-only filter', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('trustedFactReads is a no-op for an already-trusted local caller', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('readableFactVisibilities', () => {
-  test("world-only readers get the ['world'] filter (incl. unset remote)", () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true })).toEqual(['world']);
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({})).toEqual(['world']);
-  });
-
-  test('trusted readers get undefined (no filter — all rows)', () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: false })).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-});

test/link-extraction.test.ts

@@ -140,6 +140,15 @@ describe('extractEntityRefs', () => {
     expect(wikiRefs[0].needsResolution).toBe(true);
   });
 
+  test('recognizes ops/ qualified wikilinks (issue #2576 bug 2)', () => {
+    // `ops` was missing from DIR_PATTERN, so [[ops/...]] fell through to
+    // the generic 2c pass (needsResolution) instead of being a real ref.
+    const refs = extractEntityRefs('Deployed via [[ops/services/pointer-agent]].');
+    expect(refs.length).toBe(1);
+    expect(refs[0].slug).toBe('ops/services/pointer-agent');
+    expect(refs[0].needsResolution).toBeUndefined();
+  });
+
   test('skips qualified-syntax tokens (those belong to 2a)', () => {
     // [[wiki:topics/ai]] looks like 2a's qualified shape — even though
     // it wouldn't satisfy DIR_PATTERN, 2c must not claim it either
@@ -1069,6 +1078,15 @@ describe('makeResolver — fallback chain', () => {
     ]);
   });
 
+  test('resolveBasenameMatches: path-style ref falls back to the tail (issue #2576 bug 2)', async () => {
+    // normalizeBasename strips slashes, so `runbooks/2026-05-01-pointer-agent`
+    // used to normalize to a garbage key that never hit the tail-keyed index.
+    const engine = makeFakeEngineWithSlugs(['ops/changes/2026-05-01-pointer-agent']);
+    const r = makeResolver(engine);
+    expect(await r.resolveBasenameMatches!('runbooks/2026-05-01-pointer-agent'))
+      .toEqual(['ops/changes/2026-05-01-pointer-agent']);
+  });
+
   test('resolveBasenameMatches: case-insensitive fallback', async () => {
     const engine = makeFakeEngineWithSlugs(['companies/fast-weigh']);
     const r = makeResolver(engine);