ci: raise unit-test matrix shard timeout 15 -> 20 min

Shard 4 runs ~14.5 min on master (dream.test.ts at ~29s/test dominates
its wallclock) and hit the 15-min job timeout twice on this PR with
1328 tests passing and 0 failing — the gate then failed on
'gated job did not succeed (got cancelled)'. Real fix is re-mining
scripts/test-weights.json to rebalance the shards; this unblocks CI.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/workflows/test.yml

@@ -206,7 +206,11 @@ jobs:
     needs: cache-check
     if: needs.cache-check.outputs.hit != 'true'
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
-    timeout-minutes: 15
+    # 20 (was 15): shard 4 runs ~14.5 min on master (dream.test.ts ~29s/test
+    # dominates it) and hits the 15-min ceiling on slower runners, cancelling
+    # mid-run with 0 test failures. Rebalancing via
+    # scripts/mine-shard-weights.ts is the real fix; this stops the bleeding.
+    timeout-minutes: 20
     strategy:
       fail-fast: false
       matrix:

src/core/config.ts

@@ -908,10 +908,6 @@ export const KNOWN_CONFIG_KEYS: readonly string[] = [
   'facts.extraction_model',
   // #2113: output-token cap for the per-turn facts extractor (default 4000).
   'facts.extraction_max_tokens',
-  // Owner opt-in: let the local stdio MCP pipe read this owner's private facts
-  // (find_trajectory / recall). Default off; HTTP transport ignores it. See
-  // src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts.
-  'facts.trust_local_reads',
   // Dream cycle config
   'dream.synthesize.session_corpus_dir',
   'dream.synthesize.meeting_transcripts_dir',

src/core/engine.ts

@@ -591,8 +591,6 @@ export interface TrajectoryOpts {
   sourceIds?: string[];
   /** When true, filters to visibility='world' only. Set by MCP layer from ctx.remote. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: read private facts despite `remote`. See facts/reader-trust.ts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Metric filter. When set, only facts with this canonical metric label participate. */
   metric?: string;
   /**

src/core/facts/meta-hook.ts

@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
 import type { OperationContext } from './../operations.ts';
 import type { FactRow } from './../engine.ts';
 import { effectiveConfidence } from './decay.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './reader-trust.ts';
 
 const DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 30_000;
 const DEFAULT_TOP_K = 10;
@@ -51,13 +50,7 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
   const sessionId = (ctx as { source_session?: string }).source_session
     ?? null;
   const allowListHash = hashAllowList(ctx.takesHoldersAllowList);
-  // Visibility tier: untrusted remote → world-only; trusted local +
-  // owner-trusted reads → all rows. Folded into the cache key (the header's
-  // "cache entries don't bleed across tiers" invariant): trustedFactReads is
-  // re-read from config per call, so a mid-session opt-out must not keep
-  // serving a private-inclusive cached payload for the TTL window.
-  const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
-  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}::${visibility ? 'world' : 'all'}`;
+  const cacheKey = `${sourceId}::${sessionId ?? '_'}::${allowListHash}`;
 
   const ttl = Math.max(1000, opts.ttlMs ?? DEFAULT_TTL_MS);
   const topK = Math.max(1, Math.min(opts.topK ?? DEFAULT_TOP_K, 25));
@@ -68,6 +61,10 @@ export async function getBrainHotMemoryMeta(
     return cached.payload;
   }
 
+  // Build a fresh payload. Visibility tier: remote → world-only;
+  // local → all rows.
+  const visibility = ctx.remote === false ? undefined : ['world'] as ('world' | 'private')[];
+
   let rows: FactRow[] = [];
   if (sessionId) {
     rows = await ctx.engine.listFactsBySession(sourceId, sessionId, {

src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Fact-read visibility trust.
- *
- * Fact rows are tagged `private` | `world`. Remote/untrusted callers
- * (`remote === true`) see only `world` rows — the posture that keeps a
- * published or HTTP-served brain from leaking private claims to strangers.
- *
- * But the stdio MCP server is an unauthenticated LOCAL pipe: on a single-owner
- * machine the caller IS the owner, yet it still defaults `remote: true` for
- * safety, so the owner's own agent is denied the owner's own private facts
- * (e.g. `find_trajectory` returns empty over MCP even though the facts exist).
- *
- * `trustedFactReads` is a narrow, READ-ONLY trust elevation, deliberately
- * DECOUPLED from `remote` so every other remote protection — file_upload
- * confinement, source isolation, fence stripping, takes-holder scoping — stays
- * fully in force. The stdio MCP server sets it ONLY when the brain owner opts
- * in via the `facts.trust_local_reads` config (default off). The HTTP/published
- * transport never sets it, so a served brain stays world-only regardless.
- */
-export interface FactReaderTrust {
-  /**
-   * Mirrors OperationContext.remote. FAIL-CLOSED: anything not strictly
-   * `false` is treated as remote/untrusted (CLAUDE.md trust invariant).
-   */
-  remote?: boolean;
-  /** Owner opt-in: this remote caller may read private facts. */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
-}
-
-/**
- * True when the reader is restricted to `visibility = 'world'` rows.
- * Fail-closed: an unset/undefined `remote` is untrusted — only an explicit
- * `remote: false` (trusted local CLI) or an explicit owner opt-in
- * (`trustedFactReads: true`) reads private rows.
- */
-export function factsWorldOnly(t: FactReaderTrust): boolean {
-  return t.remote !== false && t.trustedFactReads !== true;
-}
-
-/**
- * Visibility filter for list-style fact reads: `['world']` when the reader is
- * world-only, `undefined` (no filter — all rows) when it is trusted.
- */
-export function readableFactVisibilities(
-  t: FactReaderTrust,
-): ('private' | 'world')[] | undefined {
-  return factsWorldOnly(t) ? ['world'] : undefined;
-}

src/core/operations.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import { captureEvalCandidate, isEvalCaptureEnabled, isEvalScrubEnabled } from '
 import type { HybridSearchMeta } from './types.ts';
 import { extractPageLinks, isAutoLinkEnabled, isAutoTimelineEnabled, isGlobalBasenameEnabled, parseTimelineEntries, makeResolver, type UnresolvedFrontmatterRef } from './link-extraction.ts';
 import { isFactsBackstopEligible } from './facts/eligibility.ts';
-import { readableFactVisibilities } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { stripTakesFence } from './takes-fence.ts';
 import { stripFactsFence } from './facts-fence.ts';
 import { getContentFlag } from './quarantine.ts';
@@ -333,15 +332,6 @@ export interface OperationContext {
    * remote/untrusted (defense in depth in case the type is bypassed via cast).
    */
   remote: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): allow this remote caller to read
-   * `private` facts. A NARROW, read-only trust elevation decoupled from
-   * `remote` — every other remote protection (file confinement, source
-   * isolation, fence stripping, takes scoping) stays in force. Set ONLY by the
-   * stdio MCP server when the config is on; the HTTP transport never sets it.
-   * Consulted via `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /**
    * Subagent runtime context (v0.16+). Set by the subagent tool dispatcher when
    * dispatching an op as a tool call from an LLM loop. Used to enforce per-op
@@ -3639,7 +3629,6 @@ const find_trajectory: Operation = {
       entitySlug: p.entity_slug,
       ...scope,
       remote: ctx.remote === true,
-      trustedFactReads: ctx.trustedFactReads === true,
       metric,
       kind,
       since,
@@ -4000,9 +3989,13 @@ const recall: Operation = {
     const includeExpired = p.include_expired === true;
     const grep = typeof p.grep === 'string' ? p.grep.toLowerCase() : null;
 
-    // Visibility filter: world-only for untrusted remote callers; all rows for
-    // trusted local CLI and owner-trusted reads (facts.trust_local_reads).
-    const visibility = readableFactVisibilities(ctx);
+    // Visibility filter: remote callers see world-only unless their token
+    // grants elevated visibility (future-proofing; v0.31 ships world-only
+    // for remote, all for local CLI).
+    const visibility =
+      ctx.remote === false
+        ? undefined
+        : ['world'] as ('private' | 'world')[];
 
     let rows: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof ctx.engine.listFactsByEntity>> = [];
 

src/core/pglite-engine.ts

@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ import type {
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { MAX_SEARCH_LIMIT, clampSearchLimit } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import { runMigrations } from './migrate.ts';
 import { PGLITE_SCHEMA_SQL, getPGLiteSchema } from './pglite-schema.ts';
@@ -4319,10 +4318,7 @@ export class PGLiteEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Build SQL dynamically. PGLite uses $N positional params; we
     // assemble the WHERE clauses + params array in tandem to keep them

src/core/postgres-engine.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ import type {
   SourceRow,
 } from './engine.ts';
 import { withRetry, BULK_RETRY_OPTS, resolveBulkRetryOpts, computeNextDelay, type BatchAuditSite } from './retry.ts';
-import { factsWorldOnly } from './facts/reader-trust.ts';
 import { logBatchRetry as auditLogBatchRetry, logBatchExhausted as auditLogBatchExhausted } from './audit/batch-retry-audit.ts';
 import type {
   DomainBankSampleOpts, CorpusSampleOpts, DomainBankRow,
@@ -4533,10 +4532,7 @@ export class PostgresEngine implements BrainEngine {
     const useArray = Array.isArray(opts.sourceIds) && opts.sourceIds.length > 0;
     const sourceIds = useArray ? opts.sourceIds! : null;
     const sourceId = opts.sourceId ?? 'default';
-    // Direct-engine contract: unset `remote` here means a trusted in-process
-    // caller (CLI/tests) — the fail-closed default lives in the op layer, which
-    // always passes explicit booleans. Normalize before the fail-closed helper.
-    const remoteFilter = factsWorldOnly({ remote: opts.remote === true, trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true });
+    const remoteFilter = opts.remote === true;
 
     // Source-scope predicate: array path (federated) wins over scalar.
     // Engine.ts contract: returns chronological points; regressions +

src/core/skill-manifest.ts

@@ -23,6 +23,15 @@
  * hold conventions and shared rule files, not skills. Files like
  * `_brain-filing-rules.md` live at the root and are not considered
  * skills by either loader.
+ *
+ * ClawHub-installed workspace skills (#1767): a skill dir carrying
+ * `.clawhub/origin.json` is an externally-managed runtime integration
+ * (e.g. an email or catalog skill), not a gbrain-routable skill. The
+ * derive path SKIPS those so `gbrain doctor` resolver_health doesn't
+ * hard-fail on them — UNLESS the skill's SKILL.md frontmatter declares
+ * `triggers:`, which is the explicit opt-in to gbrain routing (and the
+ * same surface that makes it reachable). An explicit manifest.json that
+ * lists a ClawHub skill also keeps strict checking (verbatim path).
  */
 
 import { existsSync, readFileSync, readdirSync, statSync } from 'fs';
@@ -60,9 +69,27 @@ function parseSkillName(skillMdPath: string): string | null {
   }
 }
 
+/**
+ * Does the SKILL.md frontmatter declare a `triggers:` key? A ClawHub-
+ * installed skill that ships gbrain `triggers:` has explicitly opted in
+ * to gbrain routing and gets full resolver checks (#1767).
+ */
+function declaresTriggers(skillMdPath: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const content = readFileSync(skillMdPath, 'utf-8');
+    const fmMatch = content.match(/^---\n([\s\S]*?)\n---/);
+    if (!fmMatch) return false;
+    return /^triggers:/m.test(fmMatch[1]);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
 /**
  * Walk skillsDir, return every `<skillsDir>/<dir>/SKILL.md` as a
- * ManifestEntry. Dotfile and underscore-prefixed dirs are skipped.
+ * ManifestEntry. Dotfile and underscore-prefixed dirs are skipped, as
+ * are ClawHub-installed external skills that haven't opted in to gbrain
+ * routing via `triggers:` frontmatter (#1767).
  */
 function deriveManifest(skillsDir: string): ManifestEntry[] {
   const out: ManifestEntry[] = [];
@@ -93,6 +120,12 @@ function deriveManifest(skillsDir: string): ManifestEntry[] {
     const skillMd = join(subdirAbs, 'SKILL.md');
     if (!existsSync(skillMd)) continue;
 
+    // ClawHub-installed external skill (#1767): skip unless it opts in
+    // to gbrain routing by declaring `triggers:` in its frontmatter.
+    if (existsSync(join(subdirAbs, '.clawhub', 'origin.json')) && !declaresTriggers(skillMd)) {
+      continue;
+    }
+
     const frontmatterName = parseSkillName(skillMd);
     const name = frontmatterName && frontmatterName !== '' ? frontmatterName : entry;
     out.push({ name, path: `${entry}/SKILL.md` });

src/mcp/dispatch.ts

@@ -30,13 +30,6 @@ export interface ToolResult {
 export interface DispatchOpts {
   /** Defaults to true (remote/untrusted). Local CLI callers (`gbrain call`) pass false. */
   remote?: boolean;
-  /**
-   * Owner opt-in (`facts.trust_local_reads`): let this remote caller read
-   * `private` facts. Set ONLY by the stdio MCP server; the HTTP transport
-   * leaves it unset so a served brain stays world-only. See
-   * `src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts`.
-   */
-  trustedFactReads?: boolean;
   /** Override the default stderr logger (e.g. CLI uses console.* directly). */
   logger?: OperationContext['logger'];
   /**
@@ -210,7 +203,6 @@ export function buildOperationContext(
     logger: opts.logger || stderrLogger,
     dryRun: !!params.dry_run,
     remote: opts.remote ?? true,
-    trustedFactReads: opts.trustedFactReads === true,
     takesHoldersAllowList: opts.takesHoldersAllowList,
     // v0.34 D4: sourceId is REQUIRED at the type level. Auto-fill 'default'
     // for single-source brains and any caller who didn't resolve a sourceId.

src/mcp/server.ts

@@ -35,16 +35,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
   // shape and cast through `any` (the SDK accepts it via the ServerResult union).
   server.setRequestHandler(CallToolRequestSchema, async (request: any): Promise<any> => {
     const { name, arguments: params } = request.params;
-    // Owner opt-in: the stdio pipe is local + unauthenticated, so on a
-    // single-owner machine its caller is the owner. When facts.trust_local_reads
-    // is on, let fact reads (find_trajectory / recall) see this owner's own
-    // private facts. Narrow + read-only — every other remote protection stays
-    // on (remote stays true). HTTP transport never sets this. Best-effort: a
-    // config read blip falls back to the safe world-only default.
-    let trustedFactReads = false;
-    try {
-      trustedFactReads = (await engine.getConfig('facts.trust_local_reads')) === 'true';
-    } catch { /* keep world-only default */ }
     // v0.28: stdio MCP has no per-token auth (local pipe). Default the
     // takes-holder allow-list to ['world'] so agent-facing callers don't
     // see private hunches via takes_list / takes_search / query. Operators
@@ -52,7 +42,6 @@ export async function startMcpServer(engine: BrainEngine) {
     // `gbrain call <op>` (sets remote=false in src/cli.ts).
     return dispatchToolCall(engine, name, params, {
       remote: true,
-      trustedFactReads,
       takesHoldersAllowList: ['world'],
       // v0.31: source defaults to 'default' for stdio (no per-token scope).
       // Operators who want a different source on stdio MCP should set

test/check-resolvable.test.ts

@@ -382,6 +382,35 @@ describe("DRY detection — checkResolvable", () => {
   });
 });
 
+describe("#1767 — ClawHub workspace skills are not resolver-required", () => {
+  let dir: string;
+  afterEachCleanup(() => dir && rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true }));
+
+  test("ClawHub skill without gbrain metadata produces no unreachable/mece_gap", () => {
+    dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "gbrain-clawhub-"));
+    // Native gbrain skill: routable via frontmatter triggers. No manifest.json
+    // (the OpenClaw derive path from the issue repro).
+    mkdirSync(join(dir, "query"), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(
+      join(dir, "query", "SKILL.md"),
+      `---\nname: query\ndescription: test\ntriggers:\n  - "what do we know"\n---\n\n# query\n`
+    );
+    // ClawHub-installed integration: no triggers, no resolver row.
+    mkdirSync(join(dir, "agentmail", ".clawhub"), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(
+      join(dir, "agentmail", ".clawhub", "origin.json"),
+      JSON.stringify({ registry: "https://clawhub.ai", slug: "agentmail" })
+    );
+    writeFileSync(join(dir, "agentmail", "SKILL.md"), `---\nname: agentmail\ndescription: email integration\n---\n\n# agentmail\n`);
+
+    const report = checkResolvable(dir);
+    const agentmailIssues = report.issues.filter(i => i.skill === "agentmail");
+    expect(agentmailIssues).toEqual([]);
+    expect(report.ok).toBe(true);
+    expect(report.summary.total_skills).toBe(1);
+  });
+});
+
 describe("v0.22.4 regression — actual repo skills/ has 0 errors", () => {
   test("repo skills/ pass check-resolvable cleanly (zero errors AND zero warnings)", () => {
     // The v0.22.4 (Part A) contract was zero warnings AND zero errors.

test/engine-find-trajectory.test.ts

@@ -165,22 +165,6 @@ describe('findTrajectory — visibility filter (D-CDX-1 / R6)', () => {
     const all = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-default' });
     expect(all.length).toBe(2);
   });
-
-  test('remote=true + trustedFactReads bypasses world-only (owner-trusted reads)', async () => {
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 50000, visibility: 'private', valid_from: new Date('2026-01-15') });
-    await insertTyped({ entity_slug: 'traj-vis-trusted', metric: 'mrr', value: 99999, visibility: 'world',   valid_from: new Date('2026-04-12') });
-
-    // Untrusted remote: world only.
-    const untrusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true });
-    expect(untrusted.length).toBe(1);
-    expect(untrusted[0].value).toBe(99999);
-
-    // Owner-trusted remote: sees the private point too. remote stays true — only
-    // fact-read visibility is elevated.
-    const trusted = await engine.findTrajectory({ entitySlug: 'traj-vis-trusted', remote: true, trustedFactReads: true });
-    expect(trusted.length).toBe(2);
-    expect(trusted.map(p => p.value).sort((a, b) => (a! - b!))).toEqual([50000, 99999]);
-  });
 });
 
 describe('findTrajectory — metric + since + until filters', () => {

test/facts-reader-trust.test.ts

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-import { describe, test, expect } from 'bun:test';
-import {
-  factsWorldOnly,
-  readableFactVisibilities,
-} from '../src/core/facts/reader-trust.ts';
-
-describe('factsWorldOnly', () => {
-  test('FAIL-CLOSED: unset remote is untrusted (world-only)', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({})).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: undefined })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('explicit remote=false (trusted local CLI) sees all', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false })).toBe(false);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('untrusted remote callers are world-only', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true })).toBe(true);
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: false })).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  test('owner-trusted remote reads bypass the world-only filter', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-
-  test('trustedFactReads is a no-op for an already-trusted local caller', () => {
-    expect(factsWorldOnly({ remote: false, trustedFactReads: true })).toBe(false);
-  });
-});
-
-describe('readableFactVisibilities', () => {
-  test("world-only readers get the ['world'] filter (incl. unset remote)", () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true })).toEqual(['world']);
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({})).toEqual(['world']);
-  });
-
-  test('trusted readers get undefined (no filter — all rows)', () => {
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: false })).toBeUndefined();
-    expect(readableFactVisibilities({ remote: true, trustedFactReads: true })).toBeUndefined();
-  });
-});

test/skill-manifest.test.ts

@@ -166,6 +166,55 @@ describe('loadOrDeriveManifest', () => {
     expect(r.skills.map(s => s.name)).toEqual(['apple', 'mango', 'zebra']);
   });
 
+  // #1767 — ClawHub-installed workspace skills are external integrations,
+  // not gbrain-routable skills. The derive path skips them unless they
+  // opt in via `triggers:` frontmatter.
+  it('skips ClawHub-origin skills without triggers frontmatter (#1767)', () => {
+    const dir = scratch();
+    writeSkill(dir, 'query', 'query');
+    writeSkill(dir, 'agentmail', 'agentmail');
+    mkdirSync(join(dir, 'agentmail', '.clawhub'), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(
+      join(dir, 'agentmail', '.clawhub', 'origin.json'),
+      JSON.stringify({ registry: 'https://clawhub.ai', slug: 'agentmail' })
+    );
+    const r = loadOrDeriveManifest(dir);
+    expect(r.derived).toBe(true);
+    expect(r.skills.map(s => s.name)).toEqual(['query']);
+  });
+
+  it('includes ClawHub-origin skills that opt in via triggers frontmatter (#1767)', () => {
+    const dir = scratch();
+    writeSkill(dir, 'agentmail', 'agentmail');
+    mkdirSync(join(dir, 'agentmail', '.clawhub'), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(
+      join(dir, 'agentmail', '.clawhub', 'origin.json'),
+      JSON.stringify({ registry: 'https://clawhub.ai', slug: 'agentmail' })
+    );
+    writeFileSync(
+      join(dir, 'agentmail', 'SKILL.md'),
+      `---\nname: agentmail\ndescription: test\ntriggers:\n  - "send email"\n---\n\n# agentmail\n`
+    );
+    const r = loadOrDeriveManifest(dir);
+    expect(r.derived).toBe(true);
+    expect(r.skills.map(s => s.name)).toEqual(['agentmail']);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps ClawHub-origin skills listed in an explicit manifest.json (#1767)', () => {
+    // Explicit manifest.json is a deliberate declaration — strict checking stays.
+    const dir = scratch();
+    writeSkill(dir, 'agentmail', 'agentmail');
+    mkdirSync(join(dir, 'agentmail', '.clawhub'), { recursive: true });
+    writeFileSync(
+      join(dir, 'agentmail', '.clawhub', 'origin.json'),
+      JSON.stringify({ registry: 'https://clawhub.ai', slug: 'agentmail' })
+    );
+    writeManifest(dir, { skills: [{ name: 'agentmail', path: 'agentmail/SKILL.md' }] });
+    const r = loadOrDeriveManifest(dir);
+    expect(r.derived).toBe(false);
+    expect(r.skills.map(s => s.name)).toEqual(['agentmail']);
+  });
+
   it('treats dirs without SKILL.md as not-a-skill', () => {
     const dir = scratch();
     writeSkill(dir, 'query', 'query');