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* docs(designs): agent-bootstrap plan + design docs (normative, review-absorbed) The scrubbed, in-repo sources of truth for the gbrain bootstrap wave: AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_DESIGN.md (product scope/sequencing) and AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_PLAN.md (implementation; all review-finding IDs inlined). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bootstrap): format spec, question bank, identity templates, bundled assets agent.json manifest (format_version 1, initialized sentinel) + machine-local install receipt [CX2-1, CX2-12]; 12-question/6-required interview bank with consent keys and a persist:false sink for the optional provider key [CX2-13]; ten {{TOKEN}} identity templates (generic, adapted to gbrain ops — gates call recall/query/put_page, write-through-ops rule, keyless agent-authored facts, silence contract); assets embedded compiled-binary-safe via file-type imports [ENG-6]. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bootstrap): runbook, README paste block, bootstrap guide, TODOS entries BOOTSTRAP_FOR_AGENTS.md (agent-driven install runbook: CLI phase list is the source of truth, never-invent rules, Codex approvals preflight, keyless posture, failure-modes table, version stamp for the skew check); README gains the full-agent paste block pinned to latest-stable inside the Claude Code/Codex quick start (memory-only tier stays); docs/guides/bootstrap.md carries the full install/security/consent/degradation/uninstall contract. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(designs): spike instrument for the bootstrap wave (build order 0) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bootstrap): interview + render engines Interview gate with read-back confirm-hash (any later answer change clears the confirmation — the hostile single-batch case is structurally impossible), per-answer provenance, caps + escaping at set time, config-sink routing for the provider key; renderer with hard-fail token sweep, subordinate fencing of principal input, never-clobber + backups, deterministic minimal mode for the template repo, scaled byte floors. 58 unit tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bootstrap): private-repo lifecycle — repo create, attach, uninstall, run lock gh-gated private repo creation with API-verified privacy (rate-limit distinct from public), refuse-foreign-origin with attach as the sanctioned path, atomic bootstrap mutex (pid liveness + age + token), receipt-keyed uninstall that never wholesale-deletes the gbrain home and only offers --delete-brain for a brain it created; read-only PGLite lock probe (never opens the engine). 54 unit tests, injectable exec seam throughout. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(release): latest-stable ref, template-repo publish job, bootstrap CI guards release.yml advances the latest-stable tag only after assets publish (the paste block's permanent ref — copies in the wild never rot) and gains a PAT-gated publish-template job verified against the vendored tree; two skip-graceful guards (sanctioned-ref + runbook stamp; template/token bijection + placeholder assertion + generator byte-diff) wired into verify; README + runbook re-admitted to the CI cache hash; vendored deterministic template tree generated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(context): IPC v2 turn_context + 8KB assembly + visibility resolver + session identity Discriminated-union IPC with handler map, protocol echo (stale-serve detection), shared-secret gate, server-side source binding, per-kind budgets; turn-context assembly (reflex pointers + volunteered pages + world-only hot facts) under a data-not-instructions envelope trimmed to the harness's 10KB hook-output cap; facts.default_visibility resolved through one helper at all four sites (explicit caller wins, typos fail closed); typed sessionId threads _meta.session_id into the hot-memory cache key. 50 new tests; 180 adjacent tests confirmed green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(persistence): secret-scan, gbrain sources push, durability unification Pattern secret scanner (own runtime allowlist, redacted previews, corpus-write redaction mode); sources push runs the whole scan→stage→commit→pull→push sequence under one cross-platform lock (mkdir-atomic, pid+age+token) with a deny-glob backstop, commit-first divergence-safe pull, refuse-unverifiable visibility, and push-status telemetry; gbrain-home choke point unifies GBRAIN_HOME semantics with config (0700); durability is parent-repo-aware and rotates its push log at 0600. 35 new tests; 200 existing green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(sources): harden/pull gates accept sources inside a parent git repo The bootstrap workspace registers brain/ (a subdirectory) as the source; the durability core already resolves the repo root, so the command gates now check inside-a-repo rather than .git-right-here [CX2-3]. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(serve): resident maintenance sweep + keyless capability probe The lock-owning serve process now closes the persistence loop: startup (3s post-connect, best-effort, unref'd) and idle (10-min quiet intervals through the injectable timer seam) sweeps run facts-fence reconciliation, deterministic link/timeline extraction over recent workspace pages, and spend-gated corpus ingest (skipped keyless — agent-authored fences cover it). gbrain sweep --once is the trusted CLI seam bootstrap verify uses. Capability probe renders the honest keyless/keyed report. Full reuse of the cycle extractor + extract cores; 26 new tests, neighbors green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(hooks): engine-free gbrain hook command, settings writers, transcript parser Four hook events (session-start digest + crashed-session recovery push, user-prompt turn-context injection under an 800ms deadline and the 10KB cap, stop buffers, session-end corpus write with redaction/retention/dedup + best-effort push); structural JSON settings merger keyed by a _gbrain marker (foreign hooks and permissions survive); dated host-spec registry; Claude Code .jsonl parser as a spec-target with a scrubbed 7-shape fixture. Heartbeat is counters-only by construction. 59 tests; zero engine modules in the import graph. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(bootstrap): cross-link the full-agent path from the connection docs Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bootstrap): dispatcher, verify, status — the command assembled gbrain bootstrap {status,interview,render,repo,hooks,verify,uninstall,attach}: engine-free except verify (owns its engine, in-process sweep — no live-serve conflict); phase list is the TS source of truth with install.jsonl telemetry and the support blob; verify's fail-soft check suite covers the real write path (put_page → write-through file → sweep → graph floor → recall), passes keyless, persists snapshots, and ends with the first-run tour. cli.ts wired per the three-touchpoint rule; doctor gains the bootstrap check group (silent on machines with no bootstrap state). 28 new tests; 353 adjacent green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: KEY_FILES bootstrap cluster + CLAUDE.md dispatcher row (+ build:llms) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(bootstrap): e2e pins — hook-under-live-serve, attach, degraded modes, compiled binary, Docker harness The permanent pins: a real serve holds the PGLite lock while the engine-free hook completes (and a direct engine open provably throws LiveServeLockError); stale-socket fail-open; machine-2 attach with marker-keyed hook repair; decline-everything installs verify green with every degradation named; the compiled binary renders bundled templates in an empty cwd. Offline Docker harness (networkless, read-only) gated into heavy-tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bootstrap): register doctor check categories + system-of-record allow comments The six bootstrap doctor checks join OPS_CHECK_NAMES; the sweep's batch link/ timeline inserts carry the explicit extract-path allow comments (the sweep IS the extraction path for workspace pages). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): shard wedge cap tracks suite growth (1500s -> 1800s) At ~9000 tests a healthy shard finished at 1466s and two progressing shards were false-killed at the old cap; 1800s restores ~25% headroom over the slowest observed healthy shard. Real hangs still hit it. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(ci): cache-hash policy — README + runbook edits must invalidate [C2] The old deny-list assertion predates the paste block; README.md and BOOTSTRAP_FOR_AGENTS.md are policy-doc re-admissions now, so their edits must change the hash (a paste-block edit shipping under a cached green was the C2 hole). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): classify post-suite exit-hangs as warn-pass; file the leak forensics A shard killed by the wedge watchdog with every assigned file started and zero fail markers did all its work and leaked a handle at exit — pre-existing and master-reproducible (P1 TODO carries the full bisect forensics). Bun's per-test timeout turns a hung test into a (fail), so the classifier cannot mask one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(test): shard cap 2400s — the count-balanced heavy shard needs it under contention Observed: the heavy shard still progressing 22s before an 1800s kill while siblings finish at 1150-1550s (split balances file count, not weight). Filed the load-sensitive WAL-repair flake (pre-existing, master's v0.42.75.0 wave). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(bootstrap): quarantine env-mutating suites to the serial lane check-test-isolation R1: six new files mutate GBRAIN_HOME/env at module scope — the serial lane (one process per file) is the guard's prescribed home for them. All 114 tests pass post-rename. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(readme): per-harness install sections — Codex, Claude Code, then OpenClaw/Hermes Each harness gets its own complete paste-block section (desktop app first, terminal noted — Claude Code CLI is the identical harness; Codex CLI works pull-based today); the OpenClaw/Hermes platform path keeps equal weight with its one-click deploys and INSTALL_FOR_AGENTS block intact; memory-only and remote-connect tiers consolidated under 'Lighter ways in'. Supersedes the review's D5 ordering by user direction; stale heading references updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(readme): Codex as the recommended first step; OpenClaw/Hermes framed as-intended, high-cost The install section now routes newcomers explicitly: Codex first (subscription-priced, nothing to deploy), OpenClaw/Hermes as GBrain used the way it was designed — always on, at real server + API cost. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: doc-audit code chasers — broken recovery hints, stale op description, auto_link key Four small code fixes surfaced by the markdown accuracy audit: - doctor's auto-RLS recovery hint pointed at `apply-migrations --force-retry 35`, which cannot work (--force-retry targets the vX.Y.Z orchestrator registry, not the numeric schema MIGRATIONS array). Hint now points at the recreate SQL in docs/guides/rls-and-you.md; test pins against regression. - v0_11_0 migration printed the same broken-mechanism class of hint (`config set minion_mode` writes DB config nothing reads); now names `apply-migrations --mode` + preferences.json, the real setter. - submit_job's op description hardcoded a stale handler list; now points at registerBuiltinHandlers as the source plus the --follow discovery trick. - `auto_link` added to KNOWN_CONFIG_KEYS: read by link-extraction, reconcile-links, and sweep, and documented as the off-switch in brain-ops/maintain, but the allowlist rejected `config set auto_link false`. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: repo-wide accuracy + MECE reform from the 9-bucket markdown audit A code-grounded audit of every markdown file (root, architecture, guides, mcp, tutorials, docs-root, operations/eval/designs, skills, recipes) followed by a fix wave with per-bucket ownership. Four classes of change: Accuracy — every documented command/flag verified against src/ before writing: dead commands replaced with working ones (pages purge-deleted, jobs watch --follow, gbrain restore, import-based Obsidian flow, space-separated --scopes, real thin-client recipes, working isolation verification, real supervisor restart procedure, curl-based ngrok health check, real minion_mode setter); count drift fixed with rot-proof phrasing (100+ ops, 50+ bundled skills via skills/manifest.json, 140+ engine methods, KNOBS_HASH_VERSION pointer instead of hardcoded versions); stale claims corrected (search-mode defaults, RETRIEVAL pipeline order incl. autocut, sentinel rules, refusal-list mechanism, engine snapshot, shard cap 2400s + EXIT-HANG classifier in TESTING.md, latest-stable + publish-template documented in RELEASING.md as release.yml promises). MECE — one home per concept, pointers elsewhere: test isolation → TESTING.md; OAuth registration + --bind/--public-url lore → DEPLOY.md; mode bundles → guides/search-modes.md (the home the CLAUDE.md dispatcher always promised); merge contract → schema-packs.md; WAL ladder → ENGINES.md; quiet-hours → quiet-hours.md; capture taxonomy → entity-detection.md; person-page taxonomy → compiled-truth.md; brain-first protocol → brain-first-lookup.md; refresh semantics → refresh-algorithm.md; KEY_FILES.md deduplicated (58 extension entries merged, one entry per file); infra-layer.md rewritten as a pointer page. Privacy — placeholder sweep across guides, docs, skills, and recipes per the iron rule; per-release narration stripped from reference docs (current-state prose only). Bootstrap coverage — AGENTS.md pointer, RESOLVER routing row, INSTALL.md path, tutorial cross-links, keyless-mode sections in spend-controls/headless-install. skills.lock.json regenerated; llms.txt/llms-full.txt rebuilt. Gates: verify 36/36, typecheck clean, doctor 96/96, skills-integrity + resolver + build-llms + config-set + migrations all green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(readme): refresh production-brain stats to current brain-repo counts 155,795 pages / 24,589 people / 5,340 companies, counted from the brain repo's current HEAD; the "100K-page brain" framing moves to 150K to match. Cron-fleet count unchanged (its store lives on the deployment host, not in the repos available for verification). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(scan,push): modern OpenAI/Voyage key patterns, scan staged blobs not disk - secret-scan matches sk-proj-/sk-svcacct-/sk-None- and pa- Voyage keys (the bare sk- pattern missed every current OpenAI key format). - workspacePush stages first, then scans the staged index blobs via git cat-file, closing the scan-then-stage TOCTOU where a file changed between snapshot and commit shipped unscanned. - shared binary-sniff helper, memoized glob regexes, atomic push-status write, and tests for pull_conflict + gitignored deny-match paths. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): regenerate flag registry for new commands, harden shard classifier + release token - cli-flag-registry.generated.ts regenerated: bootstrap/hook/sweep and sources push --message/--allow-unverified-remote were missing, so the strict #2185 validator rejected real invocations and skipped the new commands entirely. - EXIT-HANG shard classifier now requires every assigned file to have started before warn-passing a watchdog kill (was fail-open). - release.yml passes TEMPLATE_REPO_PAT via http.extraheader, off the argv. - compiled-binary e2e fails loud in CI instead of a silent permanent skip. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(hook,sweep,ipc): non-blocking hook pushes, bounded sweep + cache, source-bound resolve - session-start/session-end no longer run synchronous git + inline push inside their self-deadline; a detached child does the push and the hook returns immediately (blocked Claude Code startup for minutes on a dirty tree before). - serve sweep drops the unbounded listAllPageRefs, resolves only candidate targets, claims corpus files atomically (no double-LLM-spend race), and caps the fence LIKE scan; heartbeat writes are O_APPEND with rare compaction. - hot-memory cache evicts expired entries and bounds entry count (the key is caller-controlled via _meta.session_id). - v1 resolve IPC honors boundSourceId like turn_context; turn-context runs its arms concurrently. doctor reads push/heartbeat thresholds from hook.ts. - new tests: doctor bootstrap checks, hook push-gate + deadline, concurrent sweep claims, cache eviction, bound-source resolve. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(bootstrap): origin-ownership gate, world visibility, collision-safe source id, consent + templates - repo adoption requires an exact receipt repo_url match or authed-owner check (undefined repo_url was a wildcard); create verifies privacy BEFORE the first push. - verify sets facts.default_visibility=world if unset, so agent-authored facts surface in per-turn context (they defaulted private before). - source_id derives a path-hash suffix when 'workspace' is taken by another checkout; every consumer reads manifest.source_id. - skipped HOOKS_CONSENT now declines (was falling through to default yes); --minimal refuses on an initialized manifest; tilde fences escaped. - MCP registration pins --surface full; status hard-fails a public origin (template door); receipt writers guard against newer/corrupt receipts; uninstall only claims brain-deleted after a real rm. - templates ship jobs disabled + provider-consent + support-relay lines; soul-audit re-runs over the shared interview bank. TODOS: 11 follow-ups. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): close adversarial-review findings — scan fails closed, whole-PEM redaction, bound repo push Cross-model adversarial pass (Claude + Codex) on the bootstrap wave: - secret scan fails CLOSED: an unreadable, oversized, or binary staged blob now blocks the push (blocked_unscannable, exit 5) instead of committing unscanned; only a confirmed staged deletion is skipped. This was the headline "block secrets before they leave the machine" property failing open. - private-key redaction spans the whole PEM block (header+body+footer), not just the header line — the base64 body no longer survives into the corpus the sweep sends to an extraction provider. - bootstrap repo commits the workspace (secret-scan-gated) before the first push and verifies the remote actually received it, so a push-fail retry can't adopt an empty remote as success. - privacy verify is re-bound to origin immediately before push (a concurrent origin rewrite between verify and push is refused). - session-end corpus write is atomic and clears the stale ingested/in-progress sidecars so a resumed session's appended transcript is re-ingested. - public-origin refusal enforced at render (not only status); MCP "already registered" is verified to target this workspace, not blessed blindly; verify probe cleanup scopes deletes to its own slugs, not a token substring; allowlist fingerprint floor raised 8→16 hex. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * v0.45.0.0 feat(bootstrap): paste-in personal-agent install for Codex + Claude Code Turns a Codex or Claude Code session into a persistent personal agent: interview-rendered identity files, a local PGLite brain, per-turn context via serve IPC (Claude Code hooks / Codex pull protocol), session-triggered persistence, and a private GitHub repo as the agent's portable body. Keyless- first (the harness model is the LLM; one optional key adds embeddings + extraction). New `gbrain bootstrap` command family + `gbrain hook` + `gbrain sweep`; doctor bootstrap health checks; latest-stable distribution ref + template-repo publish job. Opt-in, additive — existing installs untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: regenerate flag registry for security-fix flags; drop fabricated gbrain capabilities doc ref CI caught two real failures under the merged state: - the flag registry lagged the blocked_unscannable/exit-5 flags the security round added, tripping the #2185 freshness guard. - headless-install.md described the keyless capability report as a `gbrain capabilities` command, which the #3502 doc-command resolver rejects — reworded to prose (the real surface is bootstrap verify's report). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: sync KEY_FILES + bootstrap plan to security-fix behavior Cross-referenced the security-fix round against the reference docs and corrected the drift those commits introduced: - workspace-push.ts entry: stage-FIRST-then-scan order (the TOCTOU fix), fail-closed blocked_unscannable, and the sources-push status -> exit-code map. - hooks.ts entry: MCP registration pins `serve --surface full`. - hook.ts entry: session-start/session-end pushes run in a detached child (non-blocking); atomic corpus write clears stale sidecars. - bootstrap.ts entry: render hard-refuses a public origin (template door). - verify.ts entry: source_id collision resolution (workspace-<path-hash>). - AGENT_BOOTSTRAP_PLAN as-shipped delta note for the scan/stage reorder. llms bundle unchanged (KEY_FILES is link-only); build:llms and test/build-llms.test.ts green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): silence SC2016 on the intentional askpass literal in release.yml The one-shot GIT_ASKPASS script must contain literal $1 and $TEMPLATE_REPO_PAT so they expand when /bin/sh runs it at git's credential prompt, not when the outer shell writes the file — single quotes are correct. Add a scoped shellcheck disable so actionlint passes. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(skills): declare 'bootstrap my data' trigger in cold-start frontmatter The doc reform added 'bootstrap my data' to cold-start's RESOLVER.md row (to disambiguate data-bootstrap from agent-bootstrap) but not to the skill's own frontmatter triggers, tripping the RESOLVER↔frontmatter round-trip contract (resolver.test.ts). Declare it; regenerate skills.lock.json. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * feat(bootstrap): default per-turn hooks + search mode ON without a prompt Installing gbrain for your coding agent IS the consent for the behaviors that make it work, so stop re-litigating them with install-time questions whose "no" defeats the product: - Per-turn hooks (Claude Code) install ON by default — no prompt. Off-ramps: `--no-hooks` at install, `GBRAIN_HOOKS=0` at runtime, `bootstrap uninstall`. The "hooks installed" line now surfaces the kill switch so default-on is never silent. A persisted HOOKS_CONSENT=no (interview --skip) still declines. - Search mode defaults to `balanced` silently (nobody knows the modes at install; `gbrain search modes` changes it any time). - MCP scope stays the ONE deliberate prompt — project vs user is a real cross-repo privacy choice, not friction. Marks the two consents `silent: true` in the question bank (new QuestionSpec field), rewrites the runbook phases so the agent no longer asks them, adds the `--no-hooks` flag (+ registry regen), and adds default-on / opt-out tests. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(bootstrap): real end-to-end coverage — cross-session recall, per-turn content, Codex door, realistic corpus Closes the seven e2e gaps a coverage audit surfaced: the plumbing was well-unit-tested but the product claims ("Codex works, context shows up every turn with real content, it remembers across restarts, machine two recovers, Postgres works") were unproven end to end. Test-only wave — zero src changes. - Hermetic synthetic corpus (test/fixtures/bootstrap-corpus/ + a loader helper): 12 interlinked pages (52 edges, timelines), 12 world/private beliefs, 8 gold queries — curated from the gbrain-evals synthetic corpora, 100% placeholder names, so recall is asserted on a real multi-entity brain instead of a 2-node self-planted probe. - GAP1 magic moment: author a fact via the real write path, disconnect the engine, reopen against the same DB, recall it — a real session boundary, not verify.ts's same-connection SQL read-back. Plus a source-isolation assertion. - GAP2 per-turn content: hook-under-serve Pin 1 now seeds a known fact and asserts its text lands in the injected block AND private beliefs never do (was: empty brain, empty_block accepted as a pass). - GAP3 Codex door: assert the rendered AGENTS.md carries the Gate-3 brain-first pull protocol; make the fake codex shim implement `mcp get` so the [FIX7] target-verification can actually fail; the Docker cold-machine harness now exercises the hooks/MCP registration step instead of skipping it. - GAP4 corpus recall: turn-context + verify graph-floor/qrels run on the real multi-entity brain with real edges. - GAP5 attach: machine-two now re-ingests the cloned brain/ into a fresh DB and recalls a fact authored only on machine one — the multi-device payoff. - GAP6 keyed + Postgres (env-gated): real embeddings prove semantic recall a paraphrase query can reach but keyless BM25 cannot; bootstrap verify drives a real Postgres engine (skipIf DATABASE_URL/keys absent). - GAP7 persistence: session-end runs the REAL push (not the mocked seam) to a local bare remote and the remote receives the content; a planted secret is blocked at the gate; the 15-min cron installs and fires a scan-gated push. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test(bootstrap): real-agent e2e — drive the actual claude + codex binaries end to end Closes the audit's biggest gap ("no real harness ever drives a turn"). Adapts gstack's PTY/headless agent harness to prove the bootstrap install + smoke work against the REAL binaries, not PATH shims. Test/CI/docs only — zero src changes. - test/helpers/agent-harness.ts: hermetic clean-room child env (ported from gstack; drops CONDUCTOR_/CLAUDE_/GSTACK_/MCP_/GBRAIN_, promotes GSTACK_ANTHROPIC_API_KEY→ANTHROPIC_API_KEY), real-binary resolvers + auth probes, headless `claude -p --output-format stream-json` and `codex exec --json` turn runners, a gbrain stdio MCP-config writer, and a keyless brain seeder. + a fixture-parse unit test (no binary needed). - test/e2e/bootstrap-real-claude.serial.test.ts: real `gbrain bootstrap` install → REAL `claude mcp add` (verified via `claude mcp get`) → verify exit 0 → a real `claude -p --mcp-config --strict-mcp-config` turn that invokes mcp__gbrain__search and answers from the brain (proven: toolCalls include mcp__gbrain__search, final text carries the seeded fact). - test/e2e/bootstrap-real-codex.serial.test.ts: same install with REAL `codex mcp add` into a real ~/.codex/config.toml + Gate-3 pull-protocol assertion, then a real `codex exec --json` turn surfacing the fact (MCP or the pull- protocol shell path). Bounded retry absorbs codex's occasional MCP-call cancellation without softening the fact-requiring assertion. - Everything hermetic (temp HOME/CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR/CODEX_HOME/GBRAIN_HOME; real ~/.codex auth copied read-only) and skipIf-gated so it self-skips cleanly where the binaries/auth are absent. - heavy-tests.yml: gated `real-agent-e2e` job (nightly/label, never the PR shard; no-op on a runner without authed binaries). - TODOS: compiled `gbrain` binary can't serve a PGLite brain (bun compile omits the WASM/extension payloads); harness falls back to `bun run` serve. Verified against live claude 4.6 + codex 0.147.0: 15 pass / 0 fail; verify 36/36; typecheck clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(ci): real-agent-e2e job — bash array + --timeout (actionlint SC2086 + bun-test-timeout guard) The real-agent-e2e job's file loop used an unquoted $FILES (SC2086) and ran `bun test` without --timeout (check-bun-test-timeout guard). Switch to a bash array and add --timeout=600000 (real-agent turns are slow; the tests self-skip without authed binaries so it's a no-op elsewhere). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(pglite): embed WASM + extension assets so the compiled binary can serve A `bun build --compile` gbrain binary could not `serve` a PGLite brain: the compile bundles JS but not PGLite's runtime payload (pglite.wasm, initdb.wasm, pglite.data, vector/pg_trgm tarballs), so `serve` on PGLite died with a bunfs/ENOENT. Now the assets ride inside the binary. - src/core/pglite-embedded-assets.ts: embeds the five assets via `import … with { type: 'file' }` (the ENG-6 idiom) and exposes getEmbeddedPgliteOptions() → { pgliteWasmModule, initdbWasmModule, fsBundle, extensions:{vector,pg_trgm} }. WASM/fsBundle are consumed as bytes; the two extension tarballs are materialized to a content-addressed temp file (atomic, size-verified reuse) because PGLite reads them via fs.createReadStream, which cannot read a /$bunfs path. Unconditional (works in bun-run and compiled), so no fragile mode branch. - src/core/pglite-engine.ts: static-import getEmbeddedPgliteOptions (engine path stays static per the engine-dynamic-import invariant); spread into both PGlite.create sites (initial + WAL-repair retry). The bunfs classifier stays as a backstop but no longer fires for a correct binary. - scripts/check-pglite-embedded.sh (+ smoketest): compiles a focused binary and asserts it boots PGLite, CREATE EXTENSION vector/pg_trgm, and round-trips a page — wired into `bun run verify` (now 37 checks), check:all, and check:pglite-embedded. Fail-soft only when compile is unavailable. - agent-harness.ts probeCompiledPglite now passes → the real-agent e2e uses the fast compiled MCP server. TODOS: the P2 "can't serve PGLite" item is closed. Verified: fresh compiled binary ran `search`/`query` against a PGLite brain and returned the seeded row (no bunfs/ENOENT); verify 37/37; pglite-engine 120/0 source-mode; typecheck clean; engine-dynamic-import + parity guards pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
481 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
481 lines
16 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* ci-cache-hash.test.ts — adversarial coverage of the auto-cache hash.
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*
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* The cache key controls false-pass risk. If a test-affecting file is
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* accidentally deny-listed (or a file change fails to invalidate the
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* hash), broken code ships under a green CI check. This suite is the
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|
* primary safety net.
|
|
*
|
|
* Strategy: each test spins up a synthetic git repo, copies the
|
|
* ci-cache-hash.sh script in, populates a small file set covering the
|
|
* deny-list edges, runs the script, modifies one file, runs again,
|
|
* asserts hash behavior.
|
|
*
|
|
* Critical invariants (the false-pass guards):
|
|
* - CLAUDE.md edit → DIFFERENT hash
|
|
* - AGENTS.md edit → DIFFERENT hash
|
|
* - skills/foo/SKILL.md edit → DIFFERENT hash
|
|
* - src/core/db.ts edit → DIFFERENT hash
|
|
* - test/foo.test.ts edit → DIFFERENT hash
|
|
*
|
|
* Safe deny-list invariants:
|
|
* - CHANGELOG.md edit → same hash
|
|
* - docs/guide.md edit → same hash
|
|
* - TODOS.md edit → same hash
|
|
* - LICENSE edit → same hash
|
|
*
|
|
* Policy-doc re-admissions (ALLOW_PATTERNS — must invalidate):
|
|
* - README.md edit → DIFFERENT hash (carries the bootstrap paste block; a
|
|
* paste-block edit must never ship under a cached green [C2])
|
|
* - BOOTSTRAP_FOR_AGENTS.md edit → DIFFERENT hash (same reason)
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
import { afterAll, beforeAll, describe, expect, it } from "bun:test";
|
|
import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "node:child_process";
|
|
import {
|
|
cpSync,
|
|
mkdirSync,
|
|
mkdtempSync,
|
|
rmSync,
|
|
symlinkSync,
|
|
writeFileSync,
|
|
} from "node:fs";
|
|
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
|
|
import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
|
|
|
|
const REPO_ROOT = resolve(import.meta.dir, "..", "..");
|
|
const SCRIPT_SRC = resolve(REPO_ROOT, "scripts/ci-cache-hash.sh");
|
|
|
|
interface Sandbox {
|
|
dir: string;
|
|
scriptPath: string;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function makeSandbox(files: Record<string, string>): Sandbox {
|
|
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), "ci-cache-hash-"));
|
|
// Init git repo
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["init", "--quiet"], { cwd: dir });
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["config", "user.email", "test@example.com"], { cwd: dir });
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["config", "user.name", "Test"], { cwd: dir });
|
|
|
|
// Copy script under scripts/ so cd "$(dirname "$0")/.." lands at sandbox root
|
|
mkdirSync(join(dir, "scripts"), { recursive: true });
|
|
cpSync(SCRIPT_SRC, join(dir, "scripts/ci-cache-hash.sh"));
|
|
|
|
// Write each fixture file under its declared path
|
|
for (const [path, content] of Object.entries(files)) {
|
|
const abs = join(dir, path);
|
|
mkdirSync(resolve(abs, ".."), { recursive: true });
|
|
writeFileSync(abs, content);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Stage + commit so git ls-files returns them
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["add", "-A"], { cwd: dir });
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "fixture"], { cwd: dir });
|
|
|
|
return { dir, scriptPath: join(dir, "scripts/ci-cache-hash.sh") };
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function hash(s: Sandbox): string {
|
|
const r = spawnSync("bash", [s.scriptPath], {
|
|
cwd: s.dir,
|
|
encoding: "utf8",
|
|
});
|
|
if (r.status !== 0) {
|
|
throw new Error(`ci-cache-hash exit ${r.status}: ${r.stderr}`);
|
|
}
|
|
return r.stdout.trim();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
function modify(s: Sandbox, path: string, content: string) {
|
|
writeFileSync(join(s.dir, path), content);
|
|
// The script reads `git ls-files -s` which reflects the INDEX, not
|
|
// the working tree. Stage + commit so the change is visible to the
|
|
// hash. This matches what CI sees on a checked-out PR (committed
|
|
// tree, not working tree).
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["add", path], { cwd: s.dir });
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["commit", "--quiet", "-m", `modify ${path}`], {
|
|
cwd: s.dir,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
// Baseline fixtures used across most cases.
|
|
// ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
|
const BASELINE_FILES: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
"CHANGELOG.md": "# Changelog\n\n## [1.0.0]\n",
|
|
"TODOS.md": "- [ ] thing\n",
|
|
"README.md": "# Project\n",
|
|
"LICENSE": "MIT\n",
|
|
"CLAUDE.md": "# CLAUDE.md\n\nproject instructions\n",
|
|
"AGENTS.md": "# AGENTS.md\n\nopenclaw entry\n",
|
|
"package.json": '{"name":"test","version":"0.0.0"}\n',
|
|
"bun.lock": "lockfile-v1\n",
|
|
"tsconfig.json": '{"compilerOptions":{"strict":true}}\n',
|
|
"src/core/db.ts": "export const db = 1;\n",
|
|
"src/cli.ts": "console.log('hi');\n",
|
|
"test/foo.test.ts": "import {test} from 'bun:test';\ntest('x', () => {});\n",
|
|
"scripts/check-x.sh": "#!/bin/bash\necho ok\n",
|
|
".github/workflows/test.yml": "name: Test\n",
|
|
"skills/foo/SKILL.md": "---\nname: foo\n---\nFoo skill\n",
|
|
"docs/guide.md": "# Guide\n",
|
|
"docs/sub/notes.md": "Notes\n",
|
|
"docs/raw.txt": "raw text\n",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
describe("ci-cache-hash.sh — determinism", () => {
|
|
let sb: Sandbox;
|
|
beforeAll(() => {
|
|
sb = makeSandbox(BASELINE_FILES);
|
|
});
|
|
afterAll(() => {
|
|
if (sb) rmSync(sb.dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("same tree → same hash (run twice)", () => {
|
|
const h1 = hash(sb);
|
|
const h2 = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(h1).toBe(h2);
|
|
expect(h1).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{16}$/);
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("hash is 16-char lowercase hex", () => {
|
|
const h = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(h).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{16}$/);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("ci-cache-hash.sh — CRITICAL false-pass guards (must invalidate)", () => {
|
|
// Each test gets its own sandbox so modifications don't leak across cases.
|
|
|
|
function withSandbox(test: (sb: Sandbox) => void) {
|
|
const sb = makeSandbox(BASELINE_FILES);
|
|
try {
|
|
test(sb);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
rmSync(sb.dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it("CLAUDE.md edit MUST change hash (8+ test files reference it)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "CLAUDE.md", "# CLAUDE.md\n\nNEW INSTRUCTIONS\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("AGENTS.md edit MUST change hash (resolver tests read it)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "AGENTS.md", "# AGENTS.md\n\nNEW DISPATCH\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("skills/foo/SKILL.md edit MUST change hash (skill conformance tests)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "skills/foo/SKILL.md", "---\nname: foo\n---\nNEW SKILL BODY\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("src/core/db.ts edit MUST change hash", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "src/core/db.ts", "export const db = 2;\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("test/foo.test.ts edit MUST change hash", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(
|
|
sb,
|
|
"test/foo.test.ts",
|
|
"import {test} from 'bun:test';\ntest('y', () => {});\n",
|
|
);
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("package.json edit MUST change hash", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "package.json", '{"name":"test","version":"0.0.1"}\n');
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("bun.lock edit MUST change hash (dependency drift catches false-pass)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "bun.lock", "lockfile-v2\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it(".github/workflows/test.yml edit MUST change hash (CI shape change is test-affecting)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, ".github/workflows/test.yml", "name: Test\n# changed\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("ci-cache-hash.sh — SAFE deny-list invariants (must NOT invalidate)", () => {
|
|
function withSandbox(test: (sb: Sandbox) => void) {
|
|
const sb = makeSandbox(BASELINE_FILES);
|
|
try {
|
|
test(sb);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
rmSync(sb.dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it("CHANGELOG.md edit produces SAME hash (deny-listed)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "CHANGELOG.md", "# Changelog\n\n## [1.1.0]\nnew release\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("README.md edit produces DIFFERENT hash (re-admitted: carries the paste block [C2])", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "README.md", "# Project\n\nupdated tagline\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("BOOTSTRAP_FOR_AGENTS.md edit produces DIFFERENT hash (re-admitted [C2])", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
modify(sb, "BOOTSTRAP_FOR_AGENTS.md", "<!-- gbrain-runbook-stamp: 0.0.0.0 -->\n# runbook\n");
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "BOOTSTRAP_FOR_AGENTS.md", "<!-- gbrain-runbook-stamp: 0.0.0.0 -->\n# runbook v2\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("TODOS.md edit produces SAME hash (deny-listed)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "TODOS.md", "- [x] thing\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("LICENSE edit produces SAME hash (deny-listed)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "LICENSE", "Apache-2.0\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("docs/guide.md edit produces SAME hash (deny-listed via docs/**/*.md)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "docs/guide.md", "# Guide v2\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("docs/sub/notes.md edit produces SAME hash (nested docs match)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "docs/sub/notes.md", "Updated notes\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("docs/raw.txt edit produces SAME hash (deny-listed via docs/**/*.txt)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "docs/raw.txt", "new raw text\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("ci-cache-hash.sh — edge cases", () => {
|
|
function withSandbox(
|
|
files: Record<string, string>,
|
|
test: (sb: Sandbox) => void,
|
|
) {
|
|
const sb = makeSandbox(files);
|
|
try {
|
|
test(sb);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
rmSync(sb.dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it("untracked file does NOT affect hash (git ls-files only)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox(BASELINE_FILES, (sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
// Write a new file but don't `git add` it.
|
|
writeFileSync(join(sb.dir, "src/untracked.ts"), "const x = 1;\n");
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("rename detection: same content, new path → DIFFERENT hash", () => {
|
|
withSandbox(BASELINE_FILES, (sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["mv", "src/cli.ts", "src/main.ts"], { cwd: sb.dir });
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
// Same content, new path. Our hash includes the path, so it changes.
|
|
// This is correct: a rename can absolutely affect test outcomes
|
|
// (imports change, file resolution changes, etc.).
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("new file under unknown path (e.g. prompts/x.md) DOES affect hash (deny-list default)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox(BASELINE_FILES, (sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
// Add a NEW file in a path that isn't deny-listed and didn't exist
|
|
// before. Default behavior: include in hash. Closes the "missed file
|
|
// type" false-pass class (e.g. someone adds `prompts/*.md` that
|
|
// tests read).
|
|
mkdirSync(join(sb.dir, "prompts"), { recursive: true });
|
|
writeFileSync(join(sb.dir, "prompts/extract-takes.md"), "system prompt\n");
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["add", "prompts/extract-takes.md"], { cwd: sb.dir });
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "add prompts"], {
|
|
cwd: sb.dir,
|
|
});
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("symlink target change affects hash (git hash-object follows symlink contents)", () => {
|
|
// Note: git stores symlinks as the link target string, so changing
|
|
// the LINK TARGET changes the git blob sha. Our hash will catch
|
|
// that. We can't easily test "change of target's content" without
|
|
// creating an out-of-tree file, so this case pins the link-target
|
|
// path change.
|
|
withSandbox(BASELINE_FILES, (sb) => {
|
|
// Create a symlink and commit.
|
|
symlinkSync("./db.ts", join(sb.dir, "src/core/db-link.ts"));
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["add", "src/core/db-link.ts"], { cwd: sb.dir });
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "add link"], {
|
|
cwd: sb.dir,
|
|
});
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
// Point the symlink elsewhere — and commit so it lands in the
|
|
// index that `git ls-files -s` reads.
|
|
rmSync(join(sb.dir, "src/core/db-link.ts"));
|
|
symlinkSync("./cli.ts", join(sb.dir, "src/core/db-link.ts"));
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["add", "src/core/db-link.ts"], { cwd: sb.dir });
|
|
execFileSync("git", ["commit", "--quiet", "-m", "repoint link"], {
|
|
cwd: sb.dir,
|
|
});
|
|
const after = hash(sb);
|
|
expect(after).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("locale-stable: LC_ALL=de_DE.UTF-8 produces the same hash as default", () => {
|
|
withSandbox(BASELINE_FILES, (sb) => {
|
|
const defaultHash = spawnSync("bash", [sb.scriptPath], {
|
|
cwd: sb.dir,
|
|
encoding: "utf8",
|
|
}).stdout.trim();
|
|
const altLocale = spawnSync("bash", [sb.scriptPath], {
|
|
cwd: sb.dir,
|
|
encoding: "utf8",
|
|
env: { ...process.env, LC_ALL: "de_DE.UTF-8", LANG: "de_DE.UTF-8" },
|
|
}).stdout.trim();
|
|
expect(altLocale).toBe(defaultHash);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("ci-cache-hash.sh — policy-doc re-admit (test-affecting docs under docs/)", () => {
|
|
// These docs live under docs/ (normally deny-listed) but carry CI/release/
|
|
// test contracts the suite reads. The re-admit must make edits to them
|
|
// invalidate the hash, WITHOUT un-denying ordinary docs.
|
|
const POLICY_FILES: Record<string, string> = {
|
|
...BASELINE_FILES,
|
|
"docs/TESTING.md": "# Testing\n\ntest tiers + isolation lint\n",
|
|
"docs/RELEASING.md": "# Releasing\n\nversion locations + ship process\n",
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
function withSandbox(test: (sb: Sandbox) => void) {
|
|
const sb = makeSandbox(POLICY_FILES);
|
|
try {
|
|
test(sb);
|
|
} finally {
|
|
rmSync(sb.dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
it("docs/TESTING.md edit MUST change hash (re-admitted policy doc)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "docs/TESTING.md", "# Testing\n\nNEW POLICY\n");
|
|
expect(hash(sb)).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("docs/RELEASING.md edit MUST change hash (re-admitted policy doc)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "docs/RELEASING.md", "# Releasing\n\nNEW SHIP RULE\n");
|
|
expect(hash(sb)).not.toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("docs/guide.md edit STILL produces same hash (re-admit is scoped, not a blanket docs un-deny)", () => {
|
|
withSandbox((sb) => {
|
|
const before = hash(sb);
|
|
modify(sb, "docs/guide.md", "# Guide v3\n");
|
|
expect(hash(sb)).toBe(before);
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
describe("ci-cache-hash.sh — usage errors", () => {
|
|
it("--bogus arg exits 2", () => {
|
|
const r = spawnSync("bash", [SCRIPT_SRC, "--bogus"], {
|
|
cwd: REPO_ROOT,
|
|
encoding: "utf8",
|
|
});
|
|
expect(r.status).toBe(2);
|
|
expect(r.stderr).toContain("usage:");
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
it("--verbose flag works (writes diagnostics to stderr, hash to stdout)", () => {
|
|
const r = spawnSync("bash", [SCRIPT_SRC, "--verbose"], {
|
|
cwd: REPO_ROOT,
|
|
encoding: "utf8",
|
|
});
|
|
expect(r.status).toBe(0);
|
|
expect(r.stdout.trim()).toMatch(/^[0-9a-f]{16}$/);
|
|
expect(r.stderr).toContain("files in hash");
|
|
});
|
|
});
|