fix: stop SessionStore treating ":memory:" as a file path (#684)

``SessionStore.__init__`` passed its ``db_path`` straight to
``secure_create()``, which touches the path and chmods it. ``:memory:`` is
a SQLite sentinel, not a filename, so this tried to create a file literally
named ``:memory:``.

On Windows ``:`` is illegal in a filename, so construction raised
``OSError: [Errno 22] Invalid argument: ':memory:'`` and the two
``tests/server/test_channel_bridge_deep_research.py`` tests failed there.
Elsewhere it succeeds and is merely wrong: it leaves a stray ``:memory:``
file in the working directory, and because ``Path(":memory:").parent`` is
``.``, ``secure_mkdir`` chmods the working directory itself to 0o700.

``KnowledgeStore``, ``TelemetryStore`` and ``TraceStore`` already guard this
exact case; ``SessionStore`` was the one store missing the check. Apply the
same guard, with the same comment.

Adds two regression tests: one that an in-memory store is usable, one that
constructing it creates no file. The second fails on every platform without
the fix, so the bug cannot silently return on Linux or macOS.

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

.github/clone-stats/badge.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "schemaVersion": 1,
   "label": "Git Clones",
-  "message": "166,579",
+  "message": "176,576",
   "color": "green",
   "namedLogo": "git"
 }

.github/clone-stats/clone-data.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
-  "total_clones": 166579,
-  "last_updated": "2026-07-20T08:53:12Z",
+  "total_clones": 176576,
+  "last_updated": "2026-07-29T08:35:42Z",
   "daily": {
     "2026-03-27": 2189,
     "2026-03-28": 1874,
@@ -116,6 +116,15 @@
     "2026-07-16": 2497,
     "2026-07-17": 1773,
     "2026-07-18": 1542,
-    "2026-07-19": 1445
+    "2026-07-19": 1445,
+    "2026-07-20": 1481,
+    "2026-07-21": 1528,
+    "2026-07-22": 1529,
+    "2026-07-23": 1209,
+    "2026-07-24": 1118,
+    "2026-07-25": 928,
+    "2026-07-26": 740,
+    "2026-07-27": 799,
+    "2026-07-28": 665
   }
 }

configs/openjarvis/examples/full-system-access.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+# Full system access: unrestricted shell and filesystem
+# Copy to ~/.openjarvis/config.toml
+#
+# WARNING: shell_exec runs arbitrary commands as your user. No command
+# allowlist, no denylist, no working-directory restriction. file_read and
+# file_write aren't restricted to any directory either. Only enable what you
+# actually want the agent to have. tools.enabled is the whole permission grant;
+# there's no second allowlist to configure.
+#
+# On macOS, this config alone does not reach TCC-protected data (Messages,
+# Mail, Photos, Safari). That requires Full Disk Access granted to the process
+# hosting the backend. See docs/user-guide/system-access.md.
+#
+# Usage:
+#   jarvis ask "What's using the most disk space in my home directory?"
+#   jarvis chat        # prompts before each shell_exec call
+
+[engine]
+default = "ollama"
+
+[intelligence]
+default_model = "qwen3.5:9b"
+
+[agent]
+default_agent = "orchestrator"
+max_turns = 10
+
+[tools]
+enabled = [
+    "shell_exec",
+    "file_read",
+    "file_write",
+    "apply_patch",
+    "code_interpreter",
+    "git_status",
+    "git_diff",
+    "think",
+    "calculator",
+]

docs/getting-started/configuration.md

@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ enforce_tool_confirmation = true
 | `scan_output` | bool | `true` | Whether to scan model output. |
 | `secret_scanner` | bool | `true` | Enable secret detection (API keys, tokens, passwords). |
 | `pii_scanner` | bool | `true` | Enable PII detection (emails, SSNs, credit cards). |
-| `enforce_tool_confirmation` | bool | `true` | Require confirmation before executing tools. |
+| `enforce_tool_confirmation` | bool | `true` | Accepted but **not currently enforced**. Whether you get prompts depends on the entry point. See [System Access](../user-guide/system-access.md#confirmation-behaviour). |
 
 !!! tip "Choosing a security mode"
     Use `"warn"` during development to see what would be flagged without disrupting output.

docs/getting-started/quickstart.md

@@ -135,6 +135,19 @@ cd OpenJarvis
 This launches the backend API server and a React frontend at [http://localhost:5173](http://localhost:5173).
 You get a ChatGPT-like interface with streaming responses, tool use, energy monitoring, and a telemetry dashboard — all running locally on your hardware.
 
+Web search is available through the built-in DuckDuckGo fallback. To use
+Tavily, add `TAVILY_API_KEY` under **Settings → Tools → Web Search** after the
+app starts, or export it before starting quickstart:
+
+```bash
+export TAVILY_API_KEY="tvly-..."
+./scripts/quickstart.sh
+```
+
+The script does not automatically source `.env` files. Run `source .env`
+first if that is where you keep the key. Stop any existing OpenJarvis server
+before restarting so it inherits the updated environment.
+
 To stop all services, press ++ctrl+c++ in the terminal.
 
 !!! tip "Environment variable"

docs/user-guide/security.md

@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ enforce_tool_confirmation = true
 | `secret_scanner` | `bool` | `true` | Run `SecretScanner` on all text |
 | `pii_scanner` | `bool` | `true` | Run `PIIScanner` on all text |
 | `audit_log_path` | `str` | `~/.openjarvis/audit.db` | Path to the SQLite audit log |
-| `enforce_tool_confirmation` | `bool` | `true` | Require explicit confirmation before tool execution |
+| `enforce_tool_confirmation` | `bool` | `true` | Accepted by the loader but **not currently enforced**. See [System Access](system-access.md#confirmation-behaviour) for when prompts actually happen |
 
 !!! tip "Start with warn, tighten later"
     `mode = "warn"` is a good starting point. It lets you observe what patterns are being triggered without disrupting normal usage. Switch to `"redact"` once you are satisfied that the scanner isn't producing too many false positives for your workload.

docs/user-guide/system-access.md

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+# System Access
+
+How to give an agent access to the machine it runs on, and where the real
+limits are.
+
+!!! warning
+    `shell_exec` runs arbitrary commands as your user. There is no command
+    allowlist, no denylist, and no sandbox unless you turn one on. An agent
+    holding this tool can do anything you can do from a terminal.
+
+---
+
+## Start here: you probably have no tools enabled
+
+If the agent tells you it can't run commands or read files, that's usually not
+a permissions problem. It means no tools were enabled in the first place.
+
+Tools come from `tools.enabled`, falling back to `agent.tools`. Both default to
+empty, and an empty value builds the agent with **zero tools**. Nothing is
+enabled by default.
+
+First check whether you have a config file at all:
+
+```bash
+cat ~/.openjarvis/config.toml
+```
+
+If it isn't there, that's your answer. Create it:
+
+```toml
+[engine]
+default = "ollama"
+
+[intelligence]
+default_model = "qwen3.5:9b"
+
+[agent]
+default_agent = "orchestrator"
+
+[tools]
+enabled = ["shell_exec", "file_read", "file_write", "think"]
+```
+
+There's a fuller version at
+`configs/openjarvis/examples/full-system-access.toml`.
+
+Then confirm the list actually resolved:
+
+```bash
+python -c "from openjarvis.core.config import load_config; print(load_config().tools.enabled)"
+```
+
+---
+
+## What the tools reach
+
+| Tool | Scope |
+|------|-------|
+| `shell_exec` | Any command, as your user. 30s default timeout, 300s max, output capped at 100 KB per stream. |
+| `file_read` | Any readable path. 1 MB cap. |
+| `file_write` | Any writable path. 10 MB cap, can create parent directories. |
+| `apply_patch` | Applies unified diffs to any path. |
+| `code_interpreter` | Python in a subprocess, behind a coarse pattern blocklist. |
+
+`file_read` and `file_write` take an `allowed_dirs` argument that limits them to
+a set of directories, but no config key populates it. When it's empty every path
+is allowed. If you want a filesystem jail today, use the container sandbox
+instead of relying on these tools to enforce one.
+
+### Sensitive filenames
+
+`file_read` and `file_write` refuse names matching a short glob list: `.env`,
+`*.pem`, `id_rsa`, `credentials.*` and a dozen or so others. It matches on the
+filename only, not the path or the contents, and only those two tools consult
+it. `shell_exec`, `apply_patch` and `code_interpreter` skip it entirely, so
+`cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa` through `shell_exec` works fine. Treat it as protection
+against fat fingers, not as a security boundary.
+
+---
+
+## Confirmation behaviour
+
+`shell_exec`, `git_commit` and `agent_kill` are marked `requires_confirmation`.
+What that translates to depends entirely on how you launched the agent:
+
+| Entry point | Behaviour |
+|-------------|-----------|
+| `jarvis chat` | Prompts before each call. |
+| `jarvis ask` | Auto-approves. |
+| `jarvis agent ask` | Auto-approves. Pass `--no-yes` if you want prompts. |
+| HTTP server, desktop app | Auto-approves. Tools you added to an agent's toolkit count as pre-approved. |
+| Embedded via `SystemBuilder` | No callback is wired, so these tools fail closed. |
+
+That last row catches people out. If `shell_exec` returns "requires
+confirmation but no confirmation callback is available", you're constructing the
+agent yourself and need to pass a `confirm_callback`.
+
+!!! note "`enforce_tool_confirmation` doesn't do anything"
+    The config loader accepts `security.enforce_tool_confirmation`, but nothing
+    on the tool execution path reads it. Setting it won't change confirmation
+    behaviour anywhere. Use the table above instead.
+
+---
+
+## macOS: Full Disk Access
+
+On macOS the operating system is the real boundary, not the config. Shell
+access and ordinary file access start working as soon as you enable the tools.
+TCC-protected data does not: Messages, Mail, Photos, Safari history, Contacts
+and Calendar all stay locked, and no config key will change that.
+
+Grant Full Disk Access to whichever process hosts the backend. Child processes
+inherit it:
+
+| How you run OpenJarvis | Grant access to |
+|------------------------|-----------------|
+| CLI (`jarvis ask`, `jarvis chat`) | Your terminal (Terminal, iTerm, Warp) |
+| Desktop app | `OpenJarvis.app`, which spawns `jarvis serve` beneath it |
+| launchd (`deploy/launchd/com.openjarvis.plist`) | The `jarvis` binary, as its own entry |
+
+System Settings, then Privacy & Security, then Full Disk Access, then **+**.
+
+A launchd daemon gets its own TCC context, so granting access to Terminal does
+nothing for it. Add `/usr/local/bin/jarvis` separately.
+
+To check whether the grant took:
+
+```bash
+head -c 16 ~/Library/Messages/chat.db >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+  && echo "granted" || echo "denied"
+```
+
+Restart the host process after you change the setting.
+
+### Driving Mac apps
+
+AppleScript works through `shell_exec`:
+
+```
+osascript -e 'tell application "Music" to play'
+```
+
+macOS asks for Automation permission once per target app, the first time you
+touch it.
+
+---
+
+## What you can't do
+
+There's no computer use. OpenJarvis can't see your screen, move the pointer or
+send keystrokes. No tool for it is registered and no input automation library
+appears anywhere in the codebase, so granting Accessibility or Screen Recording
+buys you nothing on its own.
+
+The `click` and `type` actions you'll find are Playwright, scoped to a browser
+page rather than the desktop.
+
+Some of this is reachable through `shell_exec` if you bring the tooling
+yourself. `screencapture` will take screenshots once you've granted Screen
+Recording, and something like `cliclick` will move the pointer. That gets you
+scripted actions. It doesn't get you an agent that looks at the screen and
+works out where to click.
+
+---
+
+## Narrowing access
+
+Access widens and narrows through `tools.enabled`. Drop entries to take
+capabilities away. That list is the whole grant.
+
+Two stronger isolation options exist. Both are off by default:
+
+```toml
+[sandbox]
+enabled = true          # run tools inside a container
+runtime = "docker"
+
+[security.capabilities]
+enabled = true          # RBAC over declared tool capabilities
+policy_path = "~/.openjarvis/policy.yaml"
+```
+
+!!! note "Capabilities are open by default even once enabled"
+    `CapabilityPolicy` is built with `default_deny=False` and no config key
+    exposes that flag, so an agent with no explicit policy entry gets every
+    capability. Write entries for every agent you mean to restrict.
+
+For anything untrusted, reach for `docker_shell_exec` and
+`code_interpreter_docker` rather than the host-side versions.
+
+---
+
+## See also
+
+- [Security](security.md) for scanners, the audit log and guardrails
+- [Tools](tools.md) for the full registry
+- [Code Assistant](code-assistant.md) for a narrower shell-enabled setup
+- [External MCP Servers](mcp-external-servers.md) for capabilities OpenJarvis doesn't ship

frontend/src/lib/api.auth.test.ts

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import { afterEach, beforeEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from 'vitest';
 // authHeaders) that source the key and build the header.
 
 const SETTINGS_KEY = 'openjarvis-settings';
+const fetchMock = vi.fn<typeof fetch>();
 
 // Minimal in-memory localStorage stub so the helpers can run under node
 // (no jsdom dependency).
@@ -28,6 +29,8 @@ class MemoryStorage {
 beforeEach(() => {
   vi.resetModules();
   vi.stubEnv('VITE_SUPABASE_ANON_KEY', 'test-anon-key');
+  fetchMock.mockReset();
+  globalThis.fetch = fetchMock;
   (globalThis as unknown as { localStorage: MemoryStorage }).localStorage =
     new MemoryStorage();
 });
@@ -86,3 +89,50 @@ describe('authHeaders', () => {
     });
   });
 });
+
+describe('tool credentials', () => {
+  it('reads credential status from the local server', async () => {
+    fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(
+      new Response(JSON.stringify({ TAVILY_API_KEY: true }), {
+        status: 200,
+        headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      }),
+    );
+    const { fetchToolCredentialStatus } = await freshApi();
+
+    await expect(fetchToolCredentialStatus('web_search')).resolves.toEqual({
+      TAVILY_API_KEY: true,
+    });
+    expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      '/v1/tools/web_search/credentials/status',
+      { headers: {} },
+    );
+  });
+
+  it('saves a tool credential through the local server', async () => {
+    fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(new Response('{}', { status: 200 }));
+    const { saveToolCredentials } = await freshApi();
+
+    await saveToolCredentials('web_search', {
+      TAVILY_API_KEY: 'tvly-test',
+    });
+
+    expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith('/v1/tools/web_search/credentials', {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
+      body: JSON.stringify({ TAVILY_API_KEY: 'tvly-test' }),
+    });
+  });
+
+  it('deletes a tool credential through the local server', async () => {
+    fetchMock.mockResolvedValue(new Response('{}', { status: 200 }));
+    const { deleteToolCredential } = await freshApi();
+
+    await deleteToolCredential('web_search', 'TAVILY_API_KEY');
+
+    expect(fetchMock).toHaveBeenCalledWith(
+      '/v1/tools/web_search/credentials/TAVILY_API_KEY',
+      { method: 'DELETE', headers: {} },
+    );
+  });
+});

frontend/src/lib/api.ts

@@ -885,6 +885,25 @@ export async function saveToolCredentials(
   if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Failed: ${res.status}`);
 }
 
+export async function fetchToolCredentialStatus(
+  toolName: string,
+): Promise<Record<string, boolean>> {
+  const res = await apiFetch(`/v1/tools/${toolName}/credentials/status`);
+  if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Failed: ${res.status}`);
+  return await res.json();
+}
+
+export async function deleteToolCredential(
+  toolName: string,
+  keyName: string,
+): Promise<void> {
+  const res = await apiFetch(
+    `/v1/tools/${encodeURIComponent(toolName)}/credentials/${encodeURIComponent(keyName)}`,
+    { method: 'DELETE' },
+  );
+  if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`Failed: ${res.status}`);
+}
+
 export interface AgentTraceDetail {
   id: string;
   agent: string;

frontend/src/pages/AgentsPage.tsx

@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ import {
   fetchAgentTrace,
   fetchManagedAgent,
   fetchAvailableTools,
-  saveToolCredentials,
   fetchModels,
   updateManagedAgent,
   fetchRecommendedModel,

frontend/src/pages/SettingsPage.tsx

@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ import {
   setInferenceSource,
   getCloudKeyStatus,
   saveCloudKey,
+  fetchToolCredentialStatus,
+  saveToolCredentials,
+  deleteToolCredential,
   isTauri,
   type InferenceSource,
 } from '../lib/api';
@@ -56,25 +59,37 @@ function OllamaModelList() {
   );
 }
 
-function ApiKeyInput({ keyName, placeholder }: { keyName: string; placeholder: string }) {
+function ApiKeyInput({
+  keyName,
+  placeholder,
+  toolName,
+}: {
+  keyName: string;
+  placeholder: string;
+  toolName?: string;
+}) {
   const [value, setValue] = useState('');
   const [saved, setSaved] = useState(false);
   const [hasKey, setHasKey] = useState(false);
   const [error, setError] = useState('');
   const desktopKeyStorage = isTauri();
+  const serverToolStorage = !desktopKeyStorage && !!toolName;
+  const canManage = desktopKeyStorage || serverToolStorage;
 
   const refresh = useCallback(async () => {
-    if (!desktopKeyStorage) {
+    if (!canManage) {
       setHasKey(false);
       return;
     }
     try {
-      const status = await getCloudKeyStatus();
+      const status = desktopKeyStorage
+        ? await getCloudKeyStatus()
+        : await fetchToolCredentialStatus(toolName!);
       setHasKey(!!status[keyName]);
     } catch {
       setHasKey(false);
     }
-  }, [desktopKeyStorage, keyName]);
+  }, [canManage, desktopKeyStorage, keyName, toolName]);
 
   useEffect(() => {
     void refresh();
@@ -87,7 +102,13 @@ function ApiKeyInput({ keyName, placeholder }: { keyName: string; placeholder: s
     if (!next) return;
     setError('');
     try {
-      await saveCloudKey(keyName, next);
+      if (desktopKeyStorage) {
+        await saveCloudKey(keyName, next);
+      } else if (toolName) {
+        await saveToolCredentials(toolName, { [keyName]: next });
+      } else {
+        return;
+      }
       setValue('');
       setHasKey(true);
       setSaved(true);
@@ -101,7 +122,13 @@ function ApiKeyInput({ keyName, placeholder }: { keyName: string; placeholder: s
   const remove = async () => {
     setError('');
     try {
-      await saveCloudKey(keyName, '');
+      if (desktopKeyStorage) {
+        await saveCloudKey(keyName, '');
+      } else if (toolName) {
+        await deleteToolCredential(toolName, keyName);
+      } else {
+        return;
+      }
       setValue('');
       setHasKey(false);
       setSaved(true);
@@ -119,8 +146,8 @@ function ApiKeyInput({ keyName, placeholder }: { keyName: string; placeholder: s
         value={value}
         onChange={e => setValue(e.target.value)}
         onBlur={() => { if (value.trim()) void save(value); }}
-        placeholder={hasKey ? 'Saved in secure storage' : placeholder}
-        disabled={!desktopKeyStorage}
+        placeholder={hasKey ? (desktopKeyStorage ? 'Saved in secure storage' : 'Saved by local server') : placeholder}
+        disabled={!canManage}
         className="w-48 px-2 py-1 rounded text-xs"
         style={{ background: 'var(--color-bg)', border: '1px solid var(--color-border)', color: 'var(--color-text)' }} />
       {hasKey && (
@@ -542,7 +569,7 @@ export function SettingsPage() {
           {/* Tools */}
           <Section title="Tools">
             <SettingRow label="Web Search" description="Tavily key for web search tool">
-              <ApiKeyInput keyName="TAVILY_API_KEY" placeholder="tvly-..." />
+              <ApiKeyInput keyName="TAVILY_API_KEY" placeholder="tvly-..." toolName="web_search" />
             </SettingRow>
           </Section>
 

mkdocs.yml

@@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ nav:
       - Telemetry: user-guide/telemetry.md
       - Evaluations: user-guide/evaluations.md
       - Benchmarks: user-guide/benchmarks.md
+      - System Access: user-guide/system-access.md
       - Security: user-guide/security.md
       - LLM-guided spec search: user-guide/llm-guided-spec-search.md
   - Leaderboard: leaderboard.md

scripts/quickstart.sh

@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@ fi
 
 # ── 7. Install Python dependencies ──────────────────────────────────
 info "Installing Python dependencies..."
-uv sync --extra desktop --quiet 2>/dev/null || uv sync --extra desktop
+uv sync --extra desktop --extra tools-search --quiet 2>/dev/null \
+  || uv sync --extra desktop --extra tools-search
 ok "Python dependencies installed"
 
 # ── 7b. Build Rust extension ──────────────────────────────────────
@@ -164,11 +165,17 @@ ok "Frontend dependencies installed"
 
 # ── 9. Start backend ────────────────────────────────────────────────
 info "Starting backend API server on port 8000..."
+if curl -sf http://localhost:8000/health &>/dev/null; then
+  fail "An OpenJarvis server is already running on port 8000. Stop it before re-running quickstart so updated environment variables are applied."
+fi
 uv run jarvis serve --port 8000 &>/dev/null &
-CLEANUP_PIDS+=($!)
+BACKEND_PID=$!
+CLEANUP_PIDS+=("$BACKEND_PID")
 sleep 3
 
-if curl -sf http://localhost:8000/health &>/dev/null; then
+if ! kill -0 "$BACKEND_PID" 2>/dev/null; then
+  fail "Backend exited during startup. Run 'uv run jarvis serve --port 8000' to see the error."
+elif curl -sf http://localhost:8000/health &>/dev/null; then
   ok "Backend running at http://localhost:8000"
 else
   warn "Backend may still be starting..."

src/openjarvis/cli/daemon_cmd.py

@@ -81,14 +81,28 @@ def start(
     if agent_name:
         cmd.extend(["--agent", agent_name])
 
-    # Start as background process
+    # Start as background process, fully detached from the launching terminal.
+    #
+    # ``start_new_session`` is POSIX-only: CPython's Windows ``_execute_child``
+    # names the parameter ``unused_start_new_session`` and ignores it. Relying
+    # on it there leaves the server sharing its parent's console, so closing
+    # that console — or logging off — delivers CTRL_CLOSE_EVENT and kills the
+    # daemon. DETACHED_PROCESS gives it no console at all; the new process
+    # group additionally stops a Ctrl-C in the parent reaching it.
     DEFAULT_CONFIG_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
     log_fh = open(_LOG_FILE, "a")  # noqa: SIM115
+    spawn_kwargs: dict = {}
+    if sys.platform == "win32":
+        spawn_kwargs["creationflags"] = (
+            subprocess.DETACHED_PROCESS | subprocess.CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP
+        )
+    else:
+        spawn_kwargs["start_new_session"] = True
     proc = subprocess.Popen(
         cmd,
         stdout=log_fh,
         stderr=log_fh,
-        start_new_session=True,
+        **spawn_kwargs,
     )
     _write_pid(proc.pid)
 

src/openjarvis/cli/serve.py

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ from rich.console import Console
 
 from openjarvis.cli._banner import print_banner
 from openjarvis.core.config import load_config
+from openjarvis.core.credentials import inject_credentials
 from openjarvis.core.events import EventBus
 from openjarvis.core.paths import get_config_dir
 from openjarvis.engine import (
@@ -122,6 +123,11 @@ def serve(
         )
         sys.exit(1)
 
+    # Tool credentials saved through the browser UI live in the OpenJarvis
+    # credential store. Restore them before engines and tools are constructed
+    # so availability checks and tool instances see the same environment.
+    inject_credentials()
+
     config = load_config()
 
     # Resolve host/port from CLI args or config

src/openjarvis/core/credentials.py

@@ -67,6 +67,24 @@ def load_credentials(path: Path | None = None) -> dict[str, dict[str, str]]:
         return tomllib.load(f)
 
 
+def _validate_credential_key(tool_name: str, key: str) -> None:
+    allowed = TOOL_CREDENTIALS.get(tool_name, [])
+    if key not in allowed:
+        raise ValueError(f"Unknown credential key '{key}' for tool '{tool_name}'")
+
+
+def _write_credentials(creds: dict[str, dict[str, str]], path: Path) -> None:
+    path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    lines: list[str] = []
+    for section, kvs in creds.items():
+        lines.append(f"[{section}]")
+        for k, v in kvs.items():
+            lines.append(f'{k} = "{v}"')
+        lines.append("")
+    path.write_text("\n".join(lines))
+    os.chmod(path, 0o600)
+
+
 def save_credential(
     tool_name: str,
     key: str,
@@ -75,9 +93,7 @@ def save_credential(
     path: Path | None = None,
 ) -> None:
     """Save a single credential key, validate, write file, and set os.environ."""
-    allowed = TOOL_CREDENTIALS.get(tool_name, [])
-    if key not in allowed:
-        raise ValueError(f"Unknown credential key '{key}' for tool '{tool_name}'")
+    _validate_credential_key(tool_name, key)
     stripped = value.strip()
     if not stripped:
         raise ValueError("Credential value must not be empty")
@@ -88,20 +104,32 @@ def save_credential(
         if tool_name not in creds:
             creds[tool_name] = {}
         creds[tool_name][key] = stripped
-
-        p.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-        lines: list[str] = []
-        for section, kvs in creds.items():
-            lines.append(f"[{section}]")
-            for k, v in kvs.items():
-                lines.append(f'{k} = "{v}"')
-            lines.append("")
-        p.write_text("\n".join(lines))
-        os.chmod(p, 0o600)
+        _write_credentials(creds, p)
 
     os.environ[key] = stripped
 
 
+def delete_credential(
+    tool_name: str,
+    key: str,
+    *,
+    path: Path | None = None,
+) -> None:
+    """Delete a persisted credential and remove it from the running process."""
+    _validate_credential_key(tool_name, key)
+    p = Path(path) if path else _default_path()
+    with _LOCK:
+        creds = load_credentials(path=p)
+        tool_creds = creds.get(tool_name)
+        if tool_creds is not None:
+            tool_creds.pop(key, None)
+            if not tool_creds:
+                creds.pop(tool_name, None)
+            _write_credentials(creds, p)
+
+    os.environ.pop(key, None)
+
+
 def get_credential_status(tool_name: str) -> dict[str, bool]:
     """Return {KEY: bool} for each required key indicating if set in env."""
     keys = TOOL_CREDENTIALS.get(tool_name, [])

src/openjarvis/server/agent_manager_routes.py

@@ -285,16 +285,17 @@ def build_tools_list() -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
             logger.debug("Could not instantiate tool %s: %s", name, exc)
             spec = None
         cred_keys = TOOL_CREDENTIALS.get(name, [])
+        has_fallback = bool(spec and spec.metadata.get("fallback"))
         items.append(
             {
                 "name": name,
                 "description": spec.description if spec else "",
                 "category": spec.category if spec else "",
                 "source": "tool",
-                "requires_credentials": len(cred_keys) > 0,
+                "requires_credentials": len(cred_keys) > 0 and not has_fallback,
                 "credential_keys": cred_keys,
                 "configured": (
-                    all(bool(os.environ.get(k)) for k in cred_keys)
+                    has_fallback or all(bool(os.environ.get(k)) for k in cred_keys)
                     if cred_keys
                     else True
                 ),
@@ -2238,6 +2239,13 @@ def create_agent_manager_router(
             saved.append(key)
         return {"saved": saved}
 
+    @tools_router.delete("/{tool_name}/credentials/{key}")
+    def remove_tool_credential(tool_name: str, key: str):
+        from openjarvis.core.credentials import delete_credential
+
+        delete_credential(tool_name, key)
+        return {"deleted": key}
+
     @tools_router.get("/{tool_name}/credentials/status")
     def credential_status(tool_name: str):
         from openjarvis.core.credentials import get_credential_status

src/openjarvis/server/session_store.py

@@ -25,9 +25,11 @@ class SessionStore:
     def __init__(self, db_path: str = "") -> None:
         if not db_path:
             db_path = str(get_config_dir() / "sessions.db")
-        from openjarvis.security.file_utils import secure_create
+        # Ensure the parent directory exists (skip for :memory:)
+        if db_path != ":memory:":
+            from openjarvis.security.file_utils import secure_create
 
-        secure_create(Path(db_path))
+            secure_create(Path(db_path))
         self._db = sqlite3.connect(db_path, check_same_thread=False)
         self._db.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
         self._create_tables()

tests/cli/test_daemon_cmd.py

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import subprocess
 from pathlib import Path
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 
@@ -79,3 +80,80 @@ class TestDaemonCommands:
             result = CliRunner().invoke(cli, ["start"])
         assert result.exit_code != 0
         assert "already running" in result.output
+
+
+class TestDaemonDetachment:
+    """The spawned server must outlive the console that started it.
+
+    ``start_new_session`` is POSIX-only — CPython's Windows ``_execute_child``
+    names the parameter ``unused_start_new_session``. Relying on it there leaves
+    the server sharing its parent's console, so closing that console (or logging
+    off) delivers CTRL_CLOSE_EVENT and kills the daemon.
+    """
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def _spawn_kwargs(platform: str) -> dict:
+        """Return the kwargs ``start`` passes to Popen when spawning the server.
+
+        ``load_config`` is stubbed because it shells out for GPU detection —
+        patching Popen wholesale would otherwise break config loading before
+        the spawn is reached.
+        """
+        with (
+            patch("openjarvis.cli.daemon_cmd._read_pid", return_value=None),
+            patch("openjarvis.cli.daemon_cmd._write_pid"),
+            patch("openjarvis.cli.daemon_cmd.load_config"),
+            patch("openjarvis.cli.daemon_cmd.sys.platform", platform),
+            patch("openjarvis.cli.daemon_cmd.subprocess.Popen") as popen,
+            patch("builtins.open", MagicMock()),
+        ):
+            popen.return_value = MagicMock(pid=4321)
+            result = CliRunner().invoke(cli, ["start"])
+            assert result.exit_code == 0, result.output
+            spawns = [
+                c for c in popen.call_args_list if c.args and "serve" in c.args[0]
+            ]
+            assert spawns, f"start did not spawn the server: {popen.call_args_list}"
+            return spawns[-1].kwargs
+
+    def test_windows_spawn_is_detached_from_the_console(self) -> None:
+        # These constants are only exported by ``subprocess`` on Windows.
+        # Supply their documented values so the simulated Windows branch is
+        # still exercised by the POSIX test job.
+        detached_process = getattr(subprocess, "DETACHED_PROCESS", 0x00000008)
+        create_new_process_group = getattr(
+            subprocess, "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP", 0x00000200
+        )
+        with (
+            patch.object(
+                subprocess,
+                "DETACHED_PROCESS",
+                detached_process,
+                create=True,
+            ),
+            patch.object(
+                subprocess,
+                "CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP",
+                create_new_process_group,
+                create=True,
+            ),
+        ):
+            kwargs = self._spawn_kwargs("win32")
+
+        flags = kwargs.get("creationflags", 0)
+        assert flags & detached_process, (
+            "server must be spawned with DETACHED_PROCESS on Windows, otherwise "
+            "closing the launching console kills it"
+        )
+        assert flags & create_new_process_group, (
+            "server must be in its own process group so Ctrl-C in the parent "
+            "console does not propagate to it"
+        )
+        assert not kwargs.get("start_new_session"), (
+            "start_new_session is ignored on Windows; it must not be relied on"
+        )
+
+    def test_posix_spawn_still_uses_start_new_session(self) -> None:
+        kwargs = self._spawn_kwargs("linux")
+        assert kwargs.get("start_new_session") is True
+        assert "creationflags" not in kwargs or kwargs["creationflags"] == 0

tests/cli/test_serve_single_build.py

@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ def test_serve_does_not_call_systembuilder_build(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
         )
     )
     set_system_spy = MagicMock()
+    inject_spy = MagicMock()
+    monkeypatch.setattr(serve_mod, "inject_credentials", inject_spy)
 
     result = _run_serve(
         tmp_path,
@@ -169,6 +171,7 @@ def test_serve_does_not_call_systembuilder_build(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
 
     assert result.exit_code == 0, result.output
     build_spy.assert_not_called()
+    inject_spy.assert_called_once_with()
 
 
 def test_executor_receives_required_system_attrs(tmp_path, monkeypatch):

tests/core/test_credentials.py

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ import os
 import pytest
 
 from openjarvis.core.credentials import (
+    delete_credential,
     get_credential_status,
+    inject_credentials,
     load_credentials,
     save_credential,
 )
@@ -54,3 +56,26 @@ def test_file_permissions(cred_path):
     save_credential("web_search", "TAVILY_API_KEY", "tvly-x", path=cred_path)
     mode = oct(cred_path.stat().st_mode & 0o777)
     assert mode == "0o600"
+
+
+def test_inject_credentials_restores_saved_value(cred_path, monkeypatch):
+    save_credential("web_search", "TAVILY_API_KEY", "tvly-persisted", path=cred_path)
+    monkeypatch.delenv("TAVILY_API_KEY")
+
+    inject_credentials(path=cred_path)
+
+    assert os.environ["TAVILY_API_KEY"] == "tvly-persisted"
+
+
+def test_delete_credential_removes_file_value_and_env(cred_path, monkeypatch):
+    save_credential("web_search", "TAVILY_API_KEY", "tvly-delete", path=cred_path)
+
+    delete_credential("web_search", "TAVILY_API_KEY", path=cred_path)
+
+    assert load_credentials(path=cred_path) == {}
+    assert "TAVILY_API_KEY" not in os.environ
+
+
+def test_delete_rejects_unknown_key(cred_path):
+    with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Unknown credential key"):
+        delete_credential("web_search", "BOGUS_KEY", path=cred_path)

tests/deployment/test_packaging.py

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent.parent
 PYPROJECT = ROOT / "pyproject.toml"
 DESKTOP_LIB_RS = ROOT / "frontend" / "src-tauri" / "src" / "lib.rs"
 WINDOWS_INSTALL_PS1 = ROOT / "deploy" / "windows" / "install.ps1"
+QUICKSTART_SH = ROOT / "scripts" / "quickstart.sh"
 
 
 def _pyproject() -> dict:
@@ -59,3 +60,9 @@ def test_windows_installer_syncs_the_native_group() -> None:
         "the Windows installer must include `--group desktop-native` so "
         "openjarvis_rust is built during source install."
     )
+
+
+def test_quickstart_installs_web_search_dependencies() -> None:
+    quickstart = QUICKSTART_SH.read_text()
+    assert "--extra tools-search" in quickstart
+    assert "already running on port 8000" in quickstart

tests/server/test_api_routes.py

@@ -37,16 +37,22 @@ class TestAgentRoutes:
 
 
 class TestMemoryRoutes:
+    # 503 is the documented response when the native ``openjarvis_rust``
+    # extension is absent from the venv (see TestMemoryRustMissing below).
+    # These tests are only asserting "the route is wired up", so a backend
+    # that cannot be built is tolerated the same way a 500 is.
+    _BACKEND_OPTIONAL = (200, 500, 503)
+
     def test_search(self):
         client = TestClient(_make_app())
         resp = client.post("/v1/memory/search", json={"query": "test"})
         # May fail if SQLite not set up, that's ok
-        assert resp.status_code in (200, 500)
+        assert resp.status_code in self._BACKEND_OPTIONAL
 
     def test_stats(self):
         client = TestClient(_make_app())
         resp = client.get("/v1/memory/stats")
-        assert resp.status_code in (200, 500)
+        assert resp.status_code in self._BACKEND_OPTIONAL
 
 
 class TestMemoryRustMissing:

tests/server/test_session_store.py

@@ -115,3 +115,29 @@ class TestLastActiveChannel:
 
     def test_returns_none_for_unknown_user(self, store):
         assert store.get_last_active_channel("nobody") is None
+
+
+class TestInMemoryDatabase:
+    """``:memory:`` is a SQLite sentinel, not a path — it must not be created.
+
+    ``secure_create`` treats it as a filename, which fails outright on Windows
+    (``:`` is illegal there) and litters the working directory elsewhere.
+    """
+
+    def test_in_memory_store_is_usable(self):
+        s = SessionStore(db_path=":memory:")
+        try:
+            session = s.get_or_create("user1", "twilio")
+            assert session["sender_id"] == "user1"
+        finally:
+            s.close()
+
+    def test_in_memory_store_creates_no_file(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+        monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path)
+        before = set(tmp_path.iterdir())
+        s = SessionStore(db_path=":memory:")
+        try:
+            assert set(tmp_path.iterdir()) == before
+            assert not (tmp_path / ":memory:").exists()
+        finally:
+            s.close()

tests/server/test_tools_endpoint.py

@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 """Tests for GET /v1/tools endpoint."""
 
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
 import pytest
 
 try:
@@ -45,3 +47,49 @@ def test_browser_meta_group():
     names = {t["name"] for t in tools}
     assert "browser" in names
     assert "browser_navigate" not in names
+
+
+def test_web_search_available_without_tavily_key(monkeypatch):
+    """DuckDuckGo fallback keeps web search usable without Tavily."""
+    from openjarvis.server.agent_manager_routes import build_tools_list
+
+    monkeypatch.delenv("TAVILY_API_KEY", raising=False)
+    tools = build_tools_list()
+    web_search = next(t for t in tools if t["name"] == "web_search")
+
+    assert web_search["configured"] is True
+    assert web_search["requires_credentials"] is False
+
+
+def test_tool_credentials_browser_lifecycle(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
+    """The browser API can save, report, and remove a Tavily key."""
+    from fastapi import FastAPI
+    from fastapi.testclient import TestClient
+
+    from openjarvis.server.agent_manager_routes import create_agent_manager_router
+
+    monkeypatch.setenv("OPENJARVIS_HOME", str(tmp_path / "openjarvis-home"))
+    monkeypatch.delenv("TAVILY_API_KEY", raising=False)
+    app = FastAPI()
+    tools_router = create_agent_manager_router(MagicMock())[3]
+    app.include_router(tools_router)
+    client = TestClient(app)
+
+    saved = client.post(
+        "/v1/tools/web_search/credentials",
+        json={"TAVILY_API_KEY": "tvly-browser-test"},
+    )
+    assert saved.status_code == 200
+    assert saved.json() == {"saved": ["TAVILY_API_KEY"]}
+    assert client.get("/v1/tools/web_search/credentials/status").json() == {
+        "TAVILY_API_KEY": True
+    }
+
+    deleted = client.delete(
+        "/v1/tools/web_search/credentials/TAVILY_API_KEY",
+    )
+    assert deleted.status_code == 200
+    assert deleted.json() == {"deleted": "TAVILY_API_KEY"}
+    assert client.get("/v1/tools/web_search/credentials/status").json() == {
+        "TAVILY_API_KEY": False
+    }