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* fix(auth): honor permissions.takes_holders for legacy bearer tokens over serve --http (#2529) The OAuth provider's legacy access_tokens branch parsed permissions.source_id but never read permissions.takes_holders, so the /mcp dispatch site's fail-closed default pinned every remote caller to world-only takes visibility — set-takes-holders was a silent no-op over serve --http, in both directions (grants above world never applied; restrictions below world didn't either). - src/core/legacy-token-scope.ts: new parseTakesHoldersAllowList shared by BOTH transports (the drift between the legacy HTTP transport's correct inline parse and the OAuth provider is how this bug shipped). [] preserved as explicit deny-all; non-array → undefined → consumer defaults ['world']. - src/core/operations.ts: AuthInfo.takesHoldersAllowList typed field (same ride-along as sourceId/allowedSources). - src/core/oauth-provider.ts: legacy branch threads the stored grant. OAuth-client tokens unchanged (no per-client storage — TODO filed). - src/mcp/http-transport.ts: converged on the shared helper (behavior no-op). - src/commands/serve-http.ts: sidecar cast replaced by the typed field. - src/core/facts/meta-hook.ts: hashAllowList gives [] its own cache key (cache identity only — payload filtering stays visibility-based). Tests: 7 verifyAccessToken cases (grant/absent/garbage/deny-all/mixed/ oauth-client/column-default), pure-helper describe, meta-hook cache-key pin, and a Postgres e2e (test/e2e/serve-http-takes-holders.test.ts) pinning the issue repro end-to-end over POST /mcp — the seam that had no coverage. Reported by @Derek95king. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(agent-voice): default-deny CORS + origin gate + loopback bind in reference server (#2477) The recipe reference server reflected any Origin into Access-Control-Allow-Origin on every route, including the unauthenticated side-effectful POSTs. Recipe is install_kind: copy-into-host-repo, so the reference is the source of truth for every future install. - Default-deny CORS: headers emitted only for exact matches against the new AGENT_VOICE_CORS_ORIGIN allowlist (comma-separated), with Vary: Origin; Allow-Credentials never set. Same-origin /call needs no configuration. - Origin gate on /session and /tool: CORS headers gate response reads, not request sends — a no-preflight "simple" cross-origin POST still executes. Disallowed Origins now 403 before any body read / upstream fetch / tool dispatch. No-Origin callers (curl, Twilio, native) and same-origin pages (Origin host == Host, tunnels included) pass. DNS rebinding stays a documented production-checklist item (TODO filed). - Loopback-default bind: HOST env, default 127.0.0.1 (mirrors gbrain serve --http --bind default); HOST=0.0.0.0 for containers/LAN. - Startup log prints the bind + CORS posture; recipe md + install manifest bumped to 0.1.1 with the production checklist rewritten to match. Tests: test/agent-voice-cors.serial.test.ts spawns the real server twice and pins default-deny, allowlist echo + trimming, preflight behavior, and the gate's ordering (evil-origin 403 vs no-origin reaching the handler). Reported by @sebastiondev. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: agent-voice origin gate fails closed on malformed Origin (#2477) Coverage-audit follow-up: a cross-origin POST with an unparseable Origin header must 403 (new URL() throws → originAllowed returns false), never fall through to the handler. A bypass here would defeat the gate. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: pin loopback-bind default + wire-level fail-closed takes default (#2529 #2477) Pre-landing review (testing specialist) flagged two revert-catching gaps: - #2477 HOST default (127.0.0.1) had no assertion — a regression to all-interfaces would pass every test. Capture the server's startup log and assert the loopback bind; add a HOST=0.0.0.0 override case. - #2529 serve-http `?? ['world']` default branch was only unit-covered. Add a 4th e2e case: a legacy token with no takes_holders key sees world-held takes but NOT brain-held ones over POST /mcp, pinning the fail-closed default end-to-end. Also assert the deny-all case returns a successful (non-error) tool result so the negatives can't pass vacuously. Verified: agent-voice 4/4, serve-http-takes-holders e2e 4/4 (real Postgres). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(auth): shared permissions decode + collision-free hot-memory cache key (#2529) Adversarial-review hardening on the #2529 fix: - The two transports shared parseTakesHoldersAllowList but still decoded the permissions column differently: the OAuth provider JSON.parse'd a string-typed value, the legacy HTTP transport didn't. On a double-encoded jsonb string scalar (#2339 class) a deny-all token would fail open to ['world'] on the HTTP transport while the provider honored it. Extract coerceLegacyPermissions into the shared module and route both through it, so "the two transports cannot drift" is literally true (shared decode + shared parse). Arrays/scalars/malformed strings → undefined (no grant). - hashAllowList used bare sentinels ('_' for undefined, '(empty)' for []), which collided with real holder values ['_'] and ['(empty)']. Encode collision-free (undefined → 'none', else JSON.stringify(sorted)) so the []-vs-undefined cache separation the #2529 change relies on holds for every holder value. Tests: coerceLegacyPermissions unit cases (object/JSON-string/malformed/ array/scalar), all existing takes-holders + meta-hook + e2e suites green. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * v0.42.74.0 fix(security): honor takes_holders over serve --http + agent-voice default-deny CORS (#2529 #2477) Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: document agent-voice HOST + AGENT_VOICE_CORS_ORIGIN env vars in install hint (v0.42.74.0) The post-install hint's env-var quick-start predated the #2477 hardening and listed neither the loopback-default HOST bind nor the default-deny AGENT_VOICE_CORS_ORIGIN allowlist. Add both as optional entries (safe by default) and refresh the stale startup-log line to match the server's actual loopback-bind output. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs: correct CHANGELOG command guidance + TODOS filing version (#2529 #2477) Ship-stage document-release caught two wrong CLI invocations in the v0.42.74.0 CHANGELOG "To take advantage" block: `gbrain auth permissions <token>` has no read-only view form (that shape errors + exits 1 — set the scope directly with `set-takes-holders <values>`), and `integrations install agent-voice --refresh` requires `--target <host-repo>`. Also correct the follow-ups TODO header from the plan's stale v0.42.56.0 guess to the actual ship version v0.42.74.0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(deps): bump js-yaml to 3.15.1 — osv GHSA-5p4m-2wfm-xmqj (#2529 #2477) osv-scan flagged js-yaml@3.15.0 (High, CVSS 7.5), fixed in 3.15.1. The transitive copy (gray-matter → js-yaml) was pinned to ^3.15.0 by the package.json `overrides` block; bump both the direct dependency and the override to ^3.15.1 so the vulnerable version is gone from bun.lock entirely (gray-matter/js-yaml now resolves to 3.15.1). Patch bump, in-range, frontmatter parsing verified (markdown + frontmatter + import + oauth suites green). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore(deps): bump admin nanoid to 3.3.18 — osv GHSA-2v37-7h3g-55p8 (#2529 #2477) osv-scan flagged nanoid@3.3.16 (High, CVSS 8.2) in admin/bun.lock, fixed in 3.3.17. nanoid is transitive (postcss → nanoid), so pin it in the admin overrides block; refresh resolves to 3.3.18 (latest patched 3.x). Admin SPA build verified green; both root and admin lockfiles now scan clean. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
190 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript
190 lines
7.9 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* E2E regression for #2529: `serve --http` honors a legacy bearer token's
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* stored `access_tokens.permissions.takes_holders` grant end-to-end.
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*
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* The seam under test — verifyAccessToken (oauth-provider.ts legacy branch)
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* → AuthInfo.takesHoldersAllowList → /mcp dispatch → engine holder filter —
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* had NO end-to-end pin before this file; that absence is how #2529 shipped
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* (the OAuth provider never read the grant, so every remote caller was
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* pinned to ['world'] regardless of what the operator configured).
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*
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* Spins up a real `gbrain serve --http` against real Postgres, seeds a page
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* with a brain-held and a world-held take, inserts legacy tokens with three
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* different grants directly (the same rows `gbrain auth create/permissions`
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* writes), and asserts `takes_list` over POST /mcp filters per grant:
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*
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* ['world','brain'] → sees both takes
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* ['world'] → world take only (brain take invisible)
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* [] → explicit deny-all: sees neither
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*
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* Run: DATABASE_URL=... bun test test/e2e/serve-http-takes-holders.test.ts
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*/
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import { describe, test, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'bun:test';
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import { setupDB, teardownDB, getConn, hasDatabase } from './helpers.ts';
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import { importFromContent } from '../../src/core/import-file.ts';
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import { hashToken, generateToken } from '../../src/core/utils.ts';
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const skip = !hasDatabase();
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const describeE2E = skip ? describe.skip : describe;
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if (skip) {
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console.log('Skipping E2E serve-http-takes-holders tests (DATABASE_URL not set)');
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}
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const PORT = 19141; // unique per e2e file — avoid collision with serve-http-oauth (19131)
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const BASE = `http://localhost:${PORT}`;
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const BRAIN_CLAIM = 'brain-held regression claim for issue 2529';
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const WORLD_CLAIM = 'world-held regression claim for issue 2529';
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describeE2E('serve --http honors permissions.takes_holders for legacy bearer tokens (#2529)', () => {
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let serverProcess: ReturnType<typeof import('child_process').spawn> | null = null;
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let fullToken: string;
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let worldToken: string;
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let denyAllToken: string;
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let noGrantToken: string;
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async function insertLegacyToken(name: string, takesHolders: string[]): Promise<string> {
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const token = generateToken('gbrain_');
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const conn = getConn();
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await conn.unsafe(
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`INSERT INTO access_tokens (id, name, token_hash, permissions)
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VALUES (gen_random_uuid(), $1, $2, $3::text::jsonb)`,
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[name, hashToken(token), JSON.stringify({ takes_holders: takesHolders })],
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);
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return token;
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}
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// A token whose permissions carry NO takes_holders key — the shape an
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// OAuth-client token or a pre-`set-takes-holders` legacy token has. The
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// dispatch site must coalesce the undefined grant to the fail-closed
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// ['world'] default over the wire (serve-http.ts `?? ['world']`).
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async function insertNoGrantToken(name: string): Promise<string> {
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const token = generateToken('gbrain_');
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await getConn().unsafe(
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`INSERT INTO access_tokens (id, name, token_hash, permissions)
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VALUES (gen_random_uuid(), $1, $2, '{}'::jsonb)`,
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[name, hashToken(token)],
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);
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return token;
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}
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beforeAll(async () => {
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const engine = await setupDB();
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const conn = getConn();
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// access_tokens is not in helpers' truncate list — clear prior runs' rows
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// so the unique name constraint can't collide.
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await conn.unsafe(`DELETE FROM access_tokens WHERE name LIKE 'takes-e2e-%'`);
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// Seed a page + two takes (one per holder tier).
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await importFromContent(engine, 'e2e/takes-regression', '# Takes Regression\n\nSeed page for #2529.', { noEmbed: true });
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const [page] = await conn.unsafe(`SELECT id FROM pages WHERE slug = 'e2e/takes-regression'`);
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await engine.addTakesBatch([
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{ page_id: page.id as number, row_num: 1, claim: BRAIN_CLAIM, kind: 'take', holder: 'brain', weight: 0.75, active: true, superseded_by: null },
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{ page_id: page.id as number, row_num: 2, claim: WORLD_CLAIM, kind: 'take', holder: 'world', weight: 0.5, active: true, superseded_by: null },
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]);
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// Legacy bearer tokens with three grant shapes — the same permissions
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// rows `gbrain auth create --takes-holders` / `set-takes-holders` write.
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fullToken = await insertLegacyToken('takes-e2e-full', ['world', 'brain']);
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worldToken = await insertLegacyToken('takes-e2e-world', ['world']);
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denyAllToken = await insertLegacyToken('takes-e2e-denyall', []);
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noGrantToken = await insertNoGrantToken('takes-e2e-nogrant');
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// Start the HTTP server (same pattern as serve-http-oauth.test.ts).
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const { spawn } = await import('child_process');
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serverProcess = spawn('bun', [
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'run', 'src/cli.ts', 'serve', '--http',
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'--port', String(PORT),
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'--public-url', `http://localhost:${PORT}`,
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], {
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cwd: process.cwd(),
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env: process.env,
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stdio: ['ignore', 'pipe', 'pipe'],
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});
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let stderr = '';
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serverProcess.stderr?.on('data', (d: Buffer) => { stderr += d.toString(); });
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let ready = false;
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for (let i = 0; i < 30; i++) {
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try {
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const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/health`);
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if (res.ok) { ready = true; break; }
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} catch {}
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await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 500));
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}
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if (!ready) throw new Error('Server failed to start within 15s.\nstderr: ' + stderr.slice(-500));
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}, 60_000);
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afterAll(async () => {
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if (serverProcess) {
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serverProcess.kill('SIGTERM');
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await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 1000));
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if (!serverProcess.killed) serverProcess.kill('SIGKILL');
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}
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try {
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await getConn().unsafe(`DELETE FROM access_tokens WHERE name LIKE 'takes-e2e-%'`);
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} catch (e: any) {
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// eslint-disable-next-line no-console
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console.error(`[afterAll] token cleanup failed: ${e.message}`);
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}
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await teardownDB();
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}, 30_000);
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async function takesListBody(token: string): Promise<string> {
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const res = await fetch(`${BASE}/mcp`, {
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method: 'POST',
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headers: {
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'Authorization': `Bearer ${token}`,
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'Content-Type': 'application/json',
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'Accept': 'application/json, text/event-stream',
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},
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body: JSON.stringify({
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jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/call',
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params: { name: 'takes_list', arguments: {} },
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}),
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});
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expect(res.status).not.toBe(401);
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return res.text();
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}
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// The MCP transport can answer as JSON or SSE (text/event-stream). Assert
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// the body carries a successful tool result, not a JSON-RPC error envelope,
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// so a negative-only content check can't pass vacuously on a broken pipeline.
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function expectToolResultOk(body: string): void {
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expect(body).toContain('"result"');
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expect(body).not.toContain('"error"');
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}
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test("['world','brain'] grant sees the brain-held take (the #2529 repro)", async () => {
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const body = await takesListBody(fullToken);
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expect(body).toContain(BRAIN_CLAIM);
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expect(body).toContain(WORLD_CLAIM);
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}, 15_000);
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test("['world'] grant sees only world-held takes — brain take stays invisible", async () => {
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const body = await takesListBody(worldToken);
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expect(body).toContain(WORLD_CLAIM);
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expect(body).not.toContain(BRAIN_CLAIM);
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}, 15_000);
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test('[] grant is explicit deny-all — sees neither take (not silently world)', async () => {
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const body = await takesListBody(denyAllToken);
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expectToolResultOk(body); // a successful empty result, not an error envelope
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expect(body).not.toContain(BRAIN_CLAIM);
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expect(body).not.toContain(WORLD_CLAIM);
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}, 15_000);
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test('no takes_holders grant → fail-closed to world-only over the wire (?? default)', async () => {
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// Pins serve-http.ts `authInfo.takesHoldersAllowList ?? ['world']`: an
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// undefined grant (OAuth clients, pre-set-takes-holders legacy tokens)
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// must see world-held takes and NOT brain-held ones through /mcp dispatch.
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const body = await takesListBody(noGrantToken);
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expect(body).toContain(WORLD_CLAIM);
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expect(body).not.toContain(BRAIN_CLAIM);
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}, 15_000);
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});
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