ComfyUI-OpenClaw/docs/release/threat_model.md

Threat Model & Trust Boundaries

This document outlines the security assumptions and trust boundaries for ComfyUI-OpenClaw. Operators should use this to understand the risks of deployment.

Trust Boundaries

1. The "Admin" Boundary

• Who: The person running ComfyUI (you).
• Access: Full filesystem access, process execution, and secret management.
• Mechanism: OS-level permissions + OPENCLAW_CONNECTOR_ADMIN_TOKEN (if remote).
• Risk: If compromised, attacker owns the machine.

2. The "Observability" Boundary

• Who: Monitoring tools or trusted dashboards.
• Access: Read-only logs (/openclaw/logs/tail), config (/openclaw/config), health.
• Mechanism: OPENCLAW_OBSERVABILITY_TOKEN.
• Redaction: Logs/Config are redacted by default to prevent secret leakage.
• Reasoning-content posture: provider reasoning / thinking traces are stripped by default from operator-visible assist responses, event streams, trace responses, callback payloads, and connector trace replies; privileged reveal is local-debug only, admin-gated, auditable, and fail-closed outside permissive local posture.

3. The "Connector" Boundary (ChatOps)

• Who: Chat users (Telegram/Discord/LINE).
• Access:
  • User: submit_job (via Allowlisted templates), query_status.
  • Admin (Chat): approve_request, cancel_job, trace.
• Mechanism: Chat platform auth + OpenClaw User Allowlist (or require_approval policy).
• Risk: Spam/DoS (mitigated by Budgets + Rate Limits), or Prompt Injection (mitigated by Template Constraints).

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Attack Surfaces

Inbound (Server)

• HTTP API: /openclaw/*, /moltbot/*.
  • Mitigation: Loopback-only by default. Token auth for remote admin/observability.
• Shared listener surface (OpenClaw + ComfyUI):
  • Risk: protecting /openclaw/* alone may still leave ComfyUI-native routes reachable when public proxy policy is broad.
  • Mitigation: enforce reverse-proxy path allowlist + network ACL; in public profile set OPENCLAW_PUBLIC_SHARED_SURFACE_BOUNDARY_ACK=1 only after those controls are verified.
• Webhooks: /openclaw/webhook/*.
  • Mitigation: Signature verification (HMAC) + Replay protection + Auth Token.

Outbound (Client)

• LLM Requests: POST to base_url.
  • Risk: SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) to internal network.
  • Mitigation: Known-host allowlist by default. Custom URLs need explicit opt-in + DNS validation.
• Callback Delivery: POST results to webhook targets.
  • Risk: SSRF / Information Leakage.
  • Mitigation: DNS-safe validation (no private IPs) + operator-payload redaction, including reasoning-content stripping by default.
• Image Fetching: image_url inputs.
  • Mitigation: SafeIO module (size limits, no file://).

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Assumptions

1. Transport Security: We assume HTTPS (TLS) is provided by a reverse proxy or tunnel (Tailscale/Cloudflare). OpenClaw serves HTTP.
2. Local Host Security: We assume the host machine is not already compromised.
3. Secret Integrity: Secrets in os.environ or .env are secure from non-admin users.

"Red Lines" (Do Not Cross)

• Never expose the raw ComfyUI port (8188) to the public internet.
• Never run OpenClaw as root / Administrator.
• Never disable OPENCLAW_CONNECTOR_ADMIN_TOKEN on a publicly accessible instance.